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# THE FORTNIGHTLY

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AUGUST, 1948

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## THE RELATION OF EDUCATION TO WAR AND PEACE

BY WILLIAM F. RUSSELL

HOW to avert war is the world's top problem. It faces the United Nations. It frustrates the foreign ministers. It drives man to despair. Coming elections will be decided on this issue. Social institutions are being studied and assessed in relation to their contribution to war and peace.

What can the schools or other means of education do to prevent war ? Teachers cannot keep the subject off their minds, because they cannot keep it off their consciences. Somehow or other, they cannot but believe that schools have something to do with war. In the preamble to UNESCO are the words : " Wars begin in the minds of men." The minds of men are what they are because of the impact of heredity and environment. Much of mental change is caused by environment. Much of environment is education. A good part of education is conscious, the work of schools and other agencies of education such as the cinema and radio.

We know that a pair of identical twins, with nearly identical heredity, will vary according to their environment. Place both in Russia, and they will support Communism. Place both in the U.S.A. and they will support free enterprise. Place one in one country and one in the other, and one will become loyal to America and the other to the Soviets ; and in these very seeds of distrust would already have been planted.

That is why in educational meetings there is so much interest in education for peace. Each of us wonders what his part is, what he can do, and how best to do it. So many suggestions are made. Societies are formed, and we are urged to join. Meetings are called, and we attend. But no single road is pointed out to us. No one map charts the way. There is no course of action upon which all agree. There are several schools of thought and here, put in a general way, are four programmes commonly accepted as central and important contributions of education to avoiding war and keeping peace.

First, there are the advocates of educational reconstruction. They believe that, in a world in shambles, with schools destroyed, teachers dispersed, equipment lacking, children hungry, homeless and vagrant, you have the situation most favourable for war. War comes from ignorance and hopelessness, when people are desperate because they are ignorant, unproductive, improvident, diseased, and gullible. Feed the people first, then clothe them, shelter them, teach and enlighten them ; and then



they will become self-supporting, self-respecting, and self-governing. Collect the money, books and equipment. Help to re-staff and re-activate the schools. Then you will have a base upon which peaceful attitudes may develop.

Within the last twelve months, I have seen some of these ruined communities with their ruined schools. I know the conditions of Houffalize, Bastogne, and Caen. The teachers there deserve our highest admiration. The drives of TICER and the NEA deserve our full support. But efforts of this type have little relation to the work of the school for either peace or war. All that reconstruction does is to open a school and get an educational programme under way. Such a programme may work either towards peace or war. When the educational reconstructors assume that the mere rebuilding of an education system is a necessary step towards peace, they make the same mistake that the Fathers of the American Constitution or the leaders of the French Revolution made when they thought that mere extension of education to all would provide a bulwark for democracy. Jefferson thought that if the people were "enlightened"—that is, schooled—all would be well. But Hitler and Hirohito have demonstrated in recent years that widespread compulsory popular education may be just as effective a bulwark for despotism.

Secondly, there are those who advocate the interchange of persons. Their theory is that war comes from isolation, from ignorance of others: do not introduce me to my neighbour, because if I met him I might like him, and I hate him. Break down barriers. Interchange pupils, students, research workers, and professors. Scandinavian boys and girls have recently visited the Metropolitan School Study Council in New York; Latin-Americans came last year. Reflect upon the extraordinary results of the educational use of the Boxer Indemnity Fund, which sent thousands of Chinese students to the U.S.A., and the Rhodes Scholarships. Write letters back and forth; interchange teachers; send thousands under the Fulbright Act. Note the work of the Guggenheim Fellows.

The fact that most American scholars from 1880 to 1900 studied in Germany did not prevent war. Recall that some of the German *alumni* of the Elsinore International School returned to Denmark as conquerors; and many of the good-will pupils sent by Germany to Norway used their knowledge to betray their benefactors. Even Otto Abetz, Gauleiter of Paris during the occupation, had previously been a student in Paris. I consider, nevertheless, that interchange of persons has great value. Surely it will make for mutual understanding, and frequently, although not always, for good will; but absence of interchange does not cause war, nor will full interchange prevent it.

Then there are those who urge free flow of communication, the share-the-ideas-school, the work-together advocates, to which UNESCO is devoting so large a share of its money. In the belief that a free flow of ideas is basic to peace, UNESCO has embarked on such projects as the



one designed "to preserve the fauna and flora of the Galapagos Islands," the establishment of an institute to study the Hylean Amazon, and the development of "fundamental education in Haiti". Of \$231,319 appropriated under formal agreement with the International Council of Scientific Societies to aid various scientific societies, \$10,936 was appropriated to foster "International Zoological Nomenclature" and \$11,740 to bring the astronomers together. Plans are being made to send parties of survey experts into various countries upon their invitation.

I am not an opponent of the share-the-ideas school. In fact, in Columbia University this is exactly the task that we have been working at for many years. Last autumn we had 451 students from foreign lands, 129 from Latin America and sixty-eight from China. We are committed to the stimulation of the free flow of ideas. I grant that such a flow is valuable for social betterment, for health, for productivity, but is it, in any sense, a guarantee against war or insurance for peace? Certainly it is unfortunately true that some former Teachers College students were active enemies of the United States before and during the 1914-1918 war.

Lastly, there is the direct teaching of international good will school. Prepare books and other curricular materials dealing with peace and international understanding; educate the teachers to carry out work of this sort; and the result will be the international mind and peace on earth. The logic of this position is easily understood. Hitler bent the German schools to war. He taught ideas of world dominance, master race, Aryan superiority, and the beauty and nobility of war. Why not reverse the process? Teach peace, interdependence of mankind, good will. The result is a lot of talk about peace. How many such talks have I heard! In fact, how many such talks have I given! I remember one in Mainz, to a typical German audience, which was most enthusiastically received. The textbooks in Bavaria and Baden in the 1920's oozed with international good will.

This school of thought is hard at work again. I am a member of the Committee on International Co-operation of the National Education Association of the United States. We have been preparing for two years a major work on teaching for peace. The World Organization of the Teaching Profession, with members all over the world, has assigned one-fifth of its appointed task for this year to a similar project. UNESCO devoted a seminar to the problem in Paris and another at Lake Success. In Mexico, I attended several meetings of the "working party" which was patiently struggling with this problem. I gathered that most of those who participated in these studies had hopes that thereby a real contribution might be made to the direction of education toward peace.

But teachers should know better. They know that such an educational programme can contribute to culture, to general education, to learning, and to the dissemination of superior practices and ideas; but to peace, that is something else again. Students of philosophy know that moral teaching



results, not so much in moral conduct as in ideas about morality ; that health teaching is apt to yield ideas about health, rather than healthy habits. So it is with the direct teaching of international good will. Some good will may be achieved ; but much more likely to ensue are ideas about good will.

These four lines of work are all good ; they are worthy of our support ; but not because of their possible contribution to peace, but rather to other desirable social goals. Not one of the four—nor all the four put together—chart the course that educators can follow or that schools and other educational institutions can follow in order to avoid war or to keep the peace. They miss the vital point.

What is the vital point ? What is the way, if any, in which education can serve the cause of war and peace ? To discover this, we should analyse again the situation in Germany and Japan in the period before the last war.

In both countries, there were flourishing school systems. Nearly everybody went to school. Nearly everybody could read and write. Book sales were high, far higher *per capita* than in the U.S.A. In Japan, you could not stop your ricksha for two minutes without the ricksha boy's picking up his book. Even the handkerchief which he wrapped around his head had a story printed on it. School opportunities were at a maximum. No educational reconstruction was needed. Both countries interchanged educational personnel. Japan used to send abroad great numbers of students, professors, scientists, and engineers. Germany sent many and received many more. Both countries were assiduous in attending international conferences, in importing ideas, and even in assisting at astronomical conventions and helping to standardize international zoological nomenclature. Nevertheless, both were geared to war.

So far as the direct teaching of international ill will was concerned, it is difficult to learn the truth. Hitler certainly forced the teaching of war and hate in the schools, but there is some difference of opinion as to the full effect. So far as Japan up to 1932 is concerned, later visitors agree with my observations in 1918 and 1921 (at a time when Japan was already anti-American and pro-German) that there was no warlike air about the schools, except possibly on the school playground. The schools had an air of kindness and friendliness, little discipline, with very little martial spirit in a uniform-ridden society.

Nevertheless, both school systems were perfect instruments for war, despite the fact that they were universal, that there was international exchange of persons, international exchange of ideas and, in the case of Japan, not too warlike appearing a programme. In each case the educational system did just what the war lords wanted because (1) it turned out the great mass of the people with basic schooling, able to earn a living, and at the same time obedient subjects of the State, looking for orders, ready



and willing to do as told, and eager for someone to tell them. In Germany they were disciplined to be subservient members of the Master State. In Japan, on the other hand, they were trained to be members of a religious sect, artificially stimulated by the Government, of which the emperor was God and Japan the chosen land. (2) In Germany, the mass of the people went to one kind of school and the potential leaders to another. They were kept apart from the common people and educated out of sympathy with them. Generally from favoured classes, they looked down on the slaves ; and the few cases of emergence from the ranks, the leaders like army sergeants become lieutenants, were even harder on the ranks. In Japan, there was less social distinction in the schools ; many leaders came from the ranks of the peasants ; but they were educated so far out of touch with the people, that they lost all sympathy. (3) Schools were purely a function of the State, and the parents had to keep out.

Here, then, are the important ways in which schools and an educational system work for the war mongers. If you want to bend the schools to war, you do not need to worry much about an iron curtain, or teacher training in patriotism, or revision of textbooks. See that every child goes to school ; keep the parents out ; make the child obey all the time. Never let him ask a question. Prohibit initiative. Permit no variation. Then train a set of leaders for this mass to obey. Pick them carefully, educate them for invention and initiative, keep them ruthless and cruel and completely devoted. You can do this more easily if you have an artificially created State Church as in Japan, or a synthetic religion of Hitler-worship as in Germany. Then you will have a perfect instrument for war.

In the words of the Ordinance of 1787 : " Religion, morality, and knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and other means of education shall forever be encouraged." But certain kinds of so-called religions, and certain codes of morality basic thereto, and certain kinds of knowledge, taught in a certain way, and certain kinds of schools and other means of education will lead to war. What is needed is the counter-active influence of the free mind, and with this, free religion and the free school. Nations are thought to be dangerous when they have huge standing armies and great military potential ; but they are only truly dangerous when either by ignorance the people are naturally subservient to political and religious fanatics, or by the prostitution of their schools they develop a manufactured subservience to cruel leaders. Stanley Baldwin once said to me : " A democracy is that kind of government in which you can have a crazy man at the head and not ruin the people." Jefferson and others of the American Founding Fathers thought that you would have good government only if you had a free mind.

If we schoolmen are highly resolved to bend our energies to keeping peace and to averting war, our task is plain. We must keep our school free, our children free, our leaders free and close to the people, and ours



parents responsible ; and we must use our full efforts to guard these liberties in our own country and in every country on earth.

That is what UNESCO ought to do ; but that is precisely what I fear it cannot do, organized as it is. It started in the minds of some teachers ; the idea was nurtured during the war by the Council of Allied Ministers of Education. But now it is an agency of governments ; and the delegates to UNESCO are government agents. In many nations the schools (and other means of education) have become instruments of national policy, or more precisely put, instruments of the policy of a political party, or of a coalition of political parties. These parties determine policy, which the Ministry of Education puts into action.

Most of the delegates to UNESCO in Mexico City had been briefed by their foreign office. Frequently the head of a delegation was a Minister or high official of a foreign office. So far as I could tell, there was only one teacher a full delegate ; and not more than a half-dozen among the alternate delegates primarily interested in teaching below the university level. What most delegates did at Mexico City had to be approved by some politician at home. For among these delegates were distinguished scholars, scientists, writers and publicists, men and women of world-wide experience ; and yet collectively they seemed so often to miss the point. Why, to add to the illustrations cited before, allot \$31,200 to the International Society of Micro-biology, including the International Centre of Type-culture Collections ? Why create an inter-secretarial translation bureau to translate the classics ? Why organize a youth service camp at Cauterets ? Why set up a service to facilitate a " widespread understanding of painting " or " an anthology of creative writing under Axis occupation " ? After having supported projects like these, a delegate could face the politicians at home without fear of unhappy consequences. No political repercussions can arise from the preservation of the fauna and flora of a remote island, nor from teaching the ABC's in Africa, nor from the study of textbooks, particularly when it is only in the U.S.A. that they are much relied on. Foreign offices will subscribe to big principles and big words ; but when it comes to a fight against political domination of the schools, don't call on the politicians.

You have to call upon the teachers and parents. Teachers with free minds who are resolved to keep free ; teachers who insist on free schools to turn out free men to keep the minds of children free ; such teachers cannot be controlled. No ministry, no inspector, no tyrant can prevail against them. Neither inspectors, nor Gestapos, nor Quislings, nor Buchenwalds can stay them from their appointed fight. For centuries, teachers in occupied countries have taught contrary to the high command. The classroom is a good place for an underground. If teachers want schools to be free they must have support.

That is why I have such great hopes for the World Organization of the Teaching Profession. Given the initial start by the National Education



Association of the United States, now composed of the leading teachers' organizations of some twenty-five countries, at present hard at work, it is an agency of great promise and enormous potential power. It can stimulate the ideas and mobilize the support of the teachers of the world. Plans must be made, tactics must be devised to fan the flame of freedom everywhere. It can learn from its own members where the flame burns bright and why ; from the intimate and accurate knowledge of teachers alone, it can tell where it flickers and burns low.

Just as teachers' associations have given powerful support to individual teachers and administrators, just as teachers' associations have walked into disgraceful school situations and have brought the full force of the indignation of our profession and friends of our profession to bear upon recalcitrant and venal school authorities, so the teachers of the world in world association, from the intimate knowledge within their own membership, can reveal facts, can point out dangerous practices by politicians, and "submit the facts to a candid world."\* If by the process of joining together in national associations and showing our indignation, we teachers can check politicians within our own land, why cannot similar pressure from teachers internationally organized check war-mongering politicians anywhere in the world ? That is why we need a Teachers' Charter, as considered by UNESCO. But far more importantly we need an Education Charter.

It is the duty of all people who love liberty to make sure that schools serve the cause of peace. Reconstruction is not enough. Interchange of persons, valuable as it is, is beside the point. Free flow of ideas, generally good, can work either toward war or peace. Direct teaching is likely to disappoint. We have a different task ; it is to work to prevent nations from developing educational programmes, under political control, to make slaves of the people. We must work to preserve the responsibility of the parent. We must keep our potential leaders close to and in sympathy with the people. We must keep the schools free.

This task is not likely to be done by politicians or financiers or cabinet ministers. It is a job for teachers and parents, individually and as they organize, and with most promise, I think, in one world organization of teachers and parents, if that can ever be attained. So it is at this precise point that we must exert our full effort, now and for the rest of our lives, if our schools are to make their greatest contribution to peace.

*(The author is Dean of Teachers College, Columbia University.)*

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\*Declaration of Independence, 1776.



## THE MIDDLE WAY

### I. THE INADEQUACY OF LIBERALISM

THE history of the nineteenth century in Europe is that of a revolt which failed owing to its own success. From the French Revolution onwards the dominant philosophy was that of Liberalism. It was freedom for which the spirit of man craved. In the denial of liberty, poets and politicians saw the prime menace to the future development of our race. Liberty, however, is most elusive and it might almost seem as if in the pursuit of illusion man found his chief delight for the space of a hundred years or more. Let us therefore ask three questions. What did the Liberals want? What did they do? What did they get?

In England the Liberals began by an attack upon the exclusive privileges of an aristocratic society. They were against any attempt to re-establish a powerful monarchy. Equally were they opposed to the political control which had been in the hands of a few wealthy families for several generations. They believed in a qualified democracy. What they wanted was a society in which the upper strata were elected by the lower to occupy the chief positions. In that way, so they believed, everyone would be satisfied. The people would exercise political responsibility by voting, the higher orders by governing. In its origin the Liberal movement was essentially political. It did not seek to change the social order—that was accepted. As for the economic framework in which society moved, it was a dogma with the early Liberals that economics was as much beyond the scope of any government as is the English weather.

Underlying this desire was a belief. The Liberal had faith in his fellow human beings. He believed them to be valuable provided they were men and not women and provided they were sensible and had property. The vast mass of individuals, however, had been crushed by tyrannical governments. They were incapable of achieving their true destiny. Man was everywhere enslaved. Clearly the remedy was to remove the chains. There must be less interference from above. Governments must allow full scope to the amazing potentialities of those they ruled. Left to himself man would quickly ascend. The shackles of his environment once removed, the slave would reveal his real worth as a free man.

The philosophic radicals went further. A free man, so they argued, would automatically follow his own true interest. If all men were free all would be following their own good and the happy result would be the final establishment of "the greatest good of the greatest number."



Theoretical Liberalism was greatly encouraged by the widespread acceptance of evolutionary ideas in the second half of the nineteenth century. The human race, it seemed, was advancing towards perfection. Such was nature's plain intention. Man, in his political development, was following nature's plan—he was evolving in the direction of an ideal State.

We may say then that what the Liberals wanted was a State whose perfection consisted in the freedom enjoyed by its subjects to live in accordance with their own desires. The individuals would not be forced to live nobly by legislation, they would create a fine society by their exemplary conduct. While there was no suggestion that the State should “wither away”, its weapon, the law, was regarded as a regulation for emergency rather than a rule to be studiously obeyed. The less the headmaster was about, the better would the boys behave. Such was the implicit trust of the idealist.

Nevertheless, the Liberals found that theory needed to be supported by practice. They were called upon to form administrations of their own. They had to handle difficult situations. Human beings, particularly when they happened to be Irish, did not appear as amenable to reason and as willing to contribute to the common good as the official theory asserted. Moreover, situations did not always remain the same. Every government was forced to legislate, and as the century wore on, more and more extensively. Liberal reforms themselves had indirect consequences which had not been foreseen. To escape from the State was found to be impossible. Instead the State had become the umpire between contending factions—often the only umpire the conflicting parties were prepared to accept. Boldly the Liberals tried to turn this situation to their own account. They sought to use the State to promote social justice. But it was a strange ending to a century of effort. They had defeated privilege but had themselves succumbed to the seductive charms of the secular sovereign State.

The nineteenth century in England is especially noted for a series of reform bills. No object was dearer to the heart of the Liberal than to extend the franchise. Without a vote how could man be free? It is in the exercise of choice that the secret of all responsibility lies. Let Parliament represent the people and then the wishes of those people would be reflected in the acts of Parliament. Nothing could be simpler. Accordingly, the Liberals pushed on their plans apace. They agitated inside and outside the House of Commons with the result that millions were eventually enfranchised who had been far beyond the pale in 1832.

But to exercise a vote, particularly when bribery has become illegal and the ballot is a secret one, requires intelligence, if the vote is to be worth anything at all. At least it necessitates the ability to read. In their anxiety to improve the political power of the masses the Liberals had advanced too quickly for the educational attainments of their countrymen.



It was soon realized that a free man is in fact a slave if he cannot read. How can he seek even his own limited welfare if he is unable to take advantage of the stored knowledge of the human mind? Yet how were the eyes of the blind to be opened that they might perceive and know, save by the instrumentality of the State? Compulsory education might be the royal road to freedom but the sound was anomalous and would it not lead before long to other compulsory orders by the State? If the way to freedom lay through slavery, might not the attempt be made in other spheres to bind the human spirit under the pretence of benevolence? The Liberal, however, accepted what seemed to him to be inevitable, in the fond hope that he was creating an intelligent electorate. Actually he was creating a public for the *Daily Mail* and adding to the burden of a powerful State the new tyranny of the penny press. The quest for liberty thus presents us with new masters, and each victory won, new battles face us on the morrow. Time and again had man been freed throughout the nineteenth century but still was he not free.

Thus we may say that the Liberal sought an ideal society. Actually he made legislation his instrument and thereby created a better regulated but still an unfree social organism. While he had not lost sight of the value of the individual, the Liberal by the year 1900 hoped to emancipate the masses by means of a well-intentioned State. The object was still the same but the method had been reversed. The employee had to be protected against the heartless selfishness of the employer. The employer had to be guarded against illegal action by the employees. You could not add up the various goods of the capitalist section of the community together with the goods of the working class and produce one gigantic common good as the result of such arithmetic. Social good lay in between the extremes and the State was alone able to decide precisely where.

To many contemporary observers political Liberalism never seemed in so impregnable a position in England as after the general election of 1906. There was, however, a fatal weakness in the Liberal position which the 1914-1918 war finally revealed. Despite the large admixture of idealism in its composition the success of the Liberal movement was everywhere bound up with the similar success of nationalism. The Liberal movement in this country was essentially British. If a conflict arose between British Liberalism and German, French or Italian Liberalism the dividing factor of nationality would be stronger than the unifying factor of a common Liberal policy. In the iron cradle of the sovereign nation State the infant Liberal was to meet its doom.

For the Liberal ever refused to face the reality of conflict in all human affairs. Just as he imagined that the nobility of men would cause them to pursue fine ideals in their daily conduct and discovered with surprise that instead men sought after selfish interests for which they were prepared to fight against the equally selfish interests of others, so in wider matters



The Liberal maintained a wholly unwarranted optimism in the kindly intentions of the human race. Man had become richer, he had become wiser, surely his conflicts must be temporary since in collective gain was to be found the universal good.

What the European Liberal failed to realize was that there had been raised up during the nineteenth century a new corporate personality whose name was the nation. Within the borders of the nation there might be room for some degree of Liberalism, but beyond those borders all was chaos. For its own ends the nation State was prepared to be quite as unscrupulous, as selfish and as malicious as any member of the criminal type within its boundaries. The criminal, however, had the law to contend with, he had the power of the State at work to crush his activities, his worst deeds were modified by the workings of his own conscience, he knew that he was condemned by the universal protest of public opinion. Between nations, however, there was no arbiter, and though there were a few conventions there was nothing which could properly speaking be regarded as law. In any case there was no-one to administer the law. Public opinion within each nation so far from checking acts of injustice in international affairs positively encouraged them. As for conscience—nations allowed their feelings to be outraged only by the actions of their neighbours.

This limitation of the field for reform to the boundaries of each nation State proved the undoing of the Liberal cause. For it was obviously the height of inconsistency to pursue a progressive policy in domestic affairs and an autocratic policy in foreign affairs. The Liberals were blowing hot and cold at the same time. So long as the unstable equilibrium continued the danger was not perceived. International anarchy, however, produced its inevitable sequel. Many illusions were shattered by war and the stability of the Liberal hegemony in England was among the chief. What had seemed a harmless sentiment, the worship of the nation, had helped to bring disaster to Europe and destruction to the principles for which the Liberals had stood.

As has been said the Liberal movement in England began as a purely political concern. It began as such—but it could not remain so. Chamberlain and Dilke forced upon the attention of a reluctant party the existence of a social question. During the thirty years which preceded the outbreak of war in 1914, social matters absorbed more and more of the time of Parliament. There was thus a subtle change of interest from the individual to the group, indicative of further changes yet to come. This indirectly led to something else—the interference of the State in the concerns of industry. The tentative encroachments of the State in the economic sphere were the beginnings of a movement which was to revolutionize the whole concept of the function of government. Almost unheeded at the time, these two innovations, concern for social and for economic matters, were the real harbingers of a new age.



The war "to make the world safe for democracy" was fought and, on the face of it, won by the forces of democracy. Yet in England Liberalism soon ceased to exist as a major political power. In Italy and Germany the whole ideal of the Liberal State was obliterated. There emerged on the Continent that new and terrifying machine, the totalitarian State. Once again the nation State had been captured, this time for a political philosophy which despised the individual and glorified the group. The initial success of Fascism was due to the fact that it supplied an answer to a need. Man was distrustful of his own powers and failed to find purpose in his puny endeavours. By identifying himself with the State, by living for a cause greater than his personal ends, self-confidence and serenity were restored. Liberalism had learnt to look askance at the nation and thus between the forces of Fascism with the feeling of nationalism to draw upon and the rising power of Socialism with a large working-class populace at its back, the political power which had dominated Europe for a hundred years was now everywhere upon the decline. The western world was thus better for her mentor. England at least would never forget some of the lessons she had been taught. But with success went lack of vigilance and then with lack of vigilance, success went. For Liberalism had been superseded.

GEOFFREY PARRISH.

## II. ITS INADEQUACY DENIED

Liberalism is not a static set of ideas, but a constantly growing view of human relations. Society itself is a growing, not static, thing, and any philosophy which seeks to supply an agenda for practical statesmanship must be ready to live and learn. Such rigidity of dogma as characterizes Marxism, such set forms of thinking as are congenial to Conservatism, are utterly alien to Liberalism, which holds that there is always "more light and truth to break forth" from the study of mankind. Nevertheless a guiding principle is clearly discernible throughout Liberal philosophy and policy. This principle has been well defined by William Aylott Orton as: "Liberty-within-community, expanding liberty within expanding community."\*

It is true, as Mr. Parrish emphasizes, that the Liberal movement was primarily political in origin and that it represented a revolt against the oligarchy of the privileged classes. But this political revolt involved an economic rebellion, which adopted the battle-cry of *laissez faire*. The battle-cry was a protest against the restrictions of the paternalist State which cramped all initiative and enterprise. Such a protest was very necessary, and it produced many beneficial results. The vast increase in the production of wealth which took place during the nineteenth century and the great rise in the standard of living which accompanied it would

\* *The Liberal Tradition*. P. 3.



ever have been possible had this country remained in the swaddling-arms of paternalism.

*Laissez faire*, however, was pushed too far. Its champions failed to realize that the wholly unregulated play of economic forces must produce gross abuses, and that there could be no real freedom of contract unless the status of the parties was more equal.

It should be emphasized, however, that the Liberal Party was never a *laissez faire* party. In fact the pioneering work in social legislation was done by Liberal governments. What the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* calls "the first really important Factory Act" (that of 1833); the Trade Unions Act of 1871; the Coal Mines Act of 1872, and the Education Act of the same year are examples. The turn of the century saw *laissez faire* virtually discarded and the Liberal Party launched on a crusade for social justice which issued in that amazing chapter of social legislation for which the Liberal governments of 1906-1914 were responsible. Liberal philosophy, based on the principle of liberty, had adapted itself to the facts of an industrial civilization.

Mr. Parrish describes this by saying that the Liberals began by wanting a State whose perfection consisted in the freedom enjoyed by its subjects to live in accordance with their own desires, but that, finding that human beings were not so amenable to reason and so willing to contribute to the common good as the official theory asserted, they were driven to legislate more and more extensively. This is scarcely fair to the Liberal philosophers, such as John Stuart Mill, T. H. Green and L. T. Hobhouse, who sought to evolve a theory of social action which would reconcile the need for State control with individual freedom; or to Liberal statesmen such as Asquith, Lloyd George and the last survivor of the great Liberal administrations of 1906-1914, Lord Samuel, who endeavoured to put his theory into practice. The development of Liberal thought and policy was not haphazard, nor was it an unreasoned (nor unwilling) reaction to the pressure of political necessity. It was a deliberate, and so far as it went a highly successful, attempt to establish "a framework of freedom."

Mr. Parrish says that the Liberal sought an ideal society but actually made legislation his instrument and thereby created a better regulated but still unfree social organism. This shows a misunderstanding both of the attitude of Liberalism and of the problem which it sought to solve. Over-legislation may be a plague, as we have cause to appreciate to-day, but more laws do not necessarily mean less freedom. On the contrary, wise laws, though limiting the freedom of some to do just as they like, can greatly extend the area of effective freedom for the many. They have in fact done so\*. But a "framework" of law and institutions within which

\* "Liberalism and State intervention are not opposed to each other. On the contrary any kind of freedom is clearly impossible unless it is guaranteed by the State." K. R. Popper, *The Open Society and its Enemies*. Volume I, p. 97.



all citizens are free to model their own lives so long as they obey the rules, is a totally different thing from a "planned society", in the totalitarian sense, with which we are now unfortunately familiar.

It is true that this "framework" is as yet far from perfect and that our social organism is still "unfree" in important respects, but that is because the march of Liberalism was brought to a full stop in 1914. Since then Britain has never had a Liberal government and for the time being Liberalism has ceased to be an effective political force. What a calamity this has been historians will testify. As Lady Violet Bonham Carter said four years ago: "It was no mere accident that the eclipse of Liberalism coincided with a period of social stagnation at home, and of tyranny, barbarism and aggression abroad"; to which it may now be added that it is no mere accident that during these last three years, when the voice of Liberalism has been impotent, we have been drifting steadily towards national bankruptcy and the "Servile State".

Mr. Parrish attributes the eclipse of Liberalism to two factors—the growth of collectivism and the anarchy of militant nationalism. In this he is right—but right in the wrong way. It is certainly true that the international anarchy, with the two world wars to which it led, was largely responsible for the Liberal decline. War is always adverse to Liberalism. The passions which it evokes and the regulation of national life which it imposes are fatal to the spirit of tolerance and freedom. The more widespread and total the war, the more destructive are its effects on Liberalism and the Liberal Party. Liberals have always recognized this; it is one of the reasons why the abolition of war has been their supreme aim.

As in the domestic sphere Liberalism sought to work out a "framework of freedom", so in the international sphere it strove to build up an institutional and legal system within which all nations, submitting to common rules and guaranteed by collective force, would be able to enjoy security and liberty. Before the 1914-1918 war Liberals were groping after such an organization and Grey made strenuous efforts to establish a 'concert' of powers which would render peace secure; unhappily he failed. After Germany's aggressive nationalism had been defeated a more ambitious attempt to outlaw war was made, and the League of Nations, which embodied the Liberal idea of the "framework", was established. Members of all parties joined in supporting this organization, but Toryism, with its nationalistic and imperialistic traditions, was never wholly sympathetic towards it, while Labour, with its pacifist streak, shrank from providing the "teeth" that were necessary to make it effective. The 'khaki' election of 1918 split the Liberal Party from top to bottom and established the Conservatives (under Mr. Lloyd George) in power.

From this blow the Liberal Party never recovered, and during the inter-war years it continued to lose ground. A further split took Lord Simon and his followers into the Tory camp, where they are now com-



pletely at home, and merely confuse the position by continuing to call themselves Liberals. With Liberalism almost powerless, successive governments paid lip-service to the League of Nations, but failed to uphold it effectively and after the shameful chapter of appeasement, Britain slid into the 1939-1945 war. The Liberal Party emerged from this second cataclysm as a mere remnant. The Tory Party was utterly discredited and the Labour Party, which appeared to present the only alternative, was swept into power and set to work to carry out its programme of "Socialism in our time."

But although the two wars, resulting from the failure to bridle militant nationalism, played so great a part in the weakening of the Liberal Party, even more serious was the effect of the first factor which Mr. Parrish mentions—the erosion of the Liberal movement by the growth of collectivism. The Labour Party arose as a protest on behalf of "the left out millions", a re-action against *laissez faire*. For this protest there was abundant cause, as Liberals fully recognized. Liberalism was, indeed, working along the same lines in so far as it was seeking to employ the powers of the State to establish social justice. But to Labour enthusiasts the pace of Liberal reform seemed too slow and, having found in State action a means of remedying the abuses of capitalism, they rushed to the conclusion that all-round public ownership was the key to Utopia. Thus in its turn the re-action against *laissez faire* went too far and, "falling down on the other side", led to the tyrant State.

This collectivist trend, which set in during the later part of last century, and gathered increasing momentum during the first three decades of the present century, sapped the Liberal Party both from without and within. It attracted the bulk of the working-class and radical vote away from Liberalism to Labour, and weakened the Liberal defences by infecting Liberals with the idea that Socialism was a more "advanced" form of their own creed. Liberals, hesitant to attack collectivism lest they should be accused of being "reactionaries", speeded their own undoing.

The Bolshevik Revolution was hailed as "light from the East" and Russia became the Mecca of many progressives. It was not until the fascists in Italy and the nazis in Germany began to copy the communist model that the real menace of the new totalitarianism became apparent. Liberalism came to be regarded as *demodé*, and the "old-fashioned liberties" associated with it seemed of minor importance compared with the "economic freedom" promised by the socialists. The collectivist tide rose higher and higher, and swept away all but the most stubborn Liberal strong-posts.

Facts, however, are forceful—and sometimes brutal—teachers, and there is growing evidence that this tide has begun to turn. It has been demonstrated that Leopold Schwartzchild was right when he wrote: "There is hardly a surer way to lose all freedom than to make the State monopolistic owner, employer and feeder," and even in the ranks of Labour the



realization is growing that nationalization is not a cure-all. Labour leaders, recoiling from the logic of their own doctrines, are calling on their followers to rally against the communist assault in defence of what they call "democratic Socialism". But "democratic Socialism" is a contradiction in terms. When Mr. Attlee complains of the growth of "a spurious thing called Socialism, which is not Socialism but a bureaucratic collectivism," Frankenstein is frightened by his own monster. During the Italian elections Signor Saragat, the leader of the socialist group that broke away from the pro-communist group led by Signor Nenni, declared that he had abandoned his belief in the nationalization of all the means of production, distribution and exchange because it had been shown that this led to totalitarianism, and as a democrat he could not support it.

Under the impulse of this anti-collectivist re-action Liberalism has risen again in this country, while on the Continent groups have been springing up making 'personalism' their watchword, and proclaiming the ideal of "expanding liberty within expanding community" as their goal. The demand for federation expresses this idea in international terms. In domestic terms it means carrying on the Liberal effort to reconcile control and freedom. Socialism obviously cannot achieve this task without ceasing to be Socialism. Its key principle is the concentration of all power in the hands of the State. Conservatism, however, offers an unattractive alternative. "Entangled," as Lord Acton put it, "in traditions, interests, expedients" it is damned by its record and however vigorously it may protest that it has undergone a change of heart it will find great difficulty in persuading the electorate that it is the champion of the common man. If it represented the only alternative to Labour, it seems probable that the socialists would remain in office indefinitely. Nor would a pact between Liberals and Tories aid in getting them out. If Liberal candidates stood aside for Conservatives (as it is obvious they would have to do in the great majority of constituencies) it is likely that a larger proportion of the votes which they might have got would go to Labour. Thus, besides being wholly unacceptable on grounds of principle, such a pact would defeat its own object.

Liberals realize these facts and are determined to maintain their independence. They are striving to "rebuild the Liberal Party as an effective political force, capable of assuming the government of this country."\* They are fully aware of the Herculean nature of this task, but they are not daunted, and, although they have suffered (and are likely to continue to suffer) losses on the right, they have been enlisting a growing number of new recruits from among the young and progressive.

The Liberal Party to-day is, indeed, a new party—new, to a great extent, in its personnel; new in its organization; and new above all in the freshness and audacity of its outlook. It confronts Socialism fearlessly,

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\* Resolution ("The Liberal Pledge") adopted by the Liberal Party Assembly, May 1946.



not with the selfish, negative "anti-ism" of the Tories, but with a consuming concern for the common man, whom Socialism would enslave, and with a burning passion for justice. Its old individualism has been transmuted into 'personalism', and its "Ownership for All" policy, which Mr. Walter James described in the April 1948 issue of *THE FORTNIGHTLY*, is arousing great enthusiasm.

If the Liberal Party be regarded as a new party striving to establish itself, rather than as an old party struggling for survival, its prospects will not appear discouraging, and the by-election reverses it has sustained will be seen in their proper perspective. Its position is comparable with that of the Labour Party when it was fighting for recognition, and it has the crusading fervour which the Labour Party then possessed but has since lost. It is capable of presenting (as the Conservatives never can do) a positive, radical alternative to the Labour Party, which should attract increasing support from the "toiling masses", since it offers what they thought they would get from Socialism but are now finding Socialism will never give—"vested rights in their own living" and a just share in profits and control. Its reasonable attitude to controls, its proposals for the readjustment of taxation, and its demand for "fair play for the small man" should appeal to the middle classes, while its call to "free trade" puts an old slogan in a new setting where it is of paramount importance.

By coming out clearly in support of federation as the goal for Europe, it has set the pace in the movement for world government, towards which forward-looking men and women in all countries are turning as the one hope of establishing lasting peace. At once realistic and idealistic, it recognizes that progress towards the achievement of its aims must be limited by present conditions, but never ceases to challenge these conditions. It does not ignore the importance of material factors, but its dynamic is moral and spiritual, and everywhere and all the time it seeks to assert the rights of men as persons.

There is thus substantial ground for believing that the eclipse of Liberalism will not be permanent, but that this new Liberal movement will provide the nucleus of a middle party round which progressives and democrats can gather, and which will constitute the third force we so sorely need. Such a party would not represent a mere compromise between extremes—"middlingness" in that sense is a most uninspiring quality—but with its own positive policy of "liberty-within-community" would make its marching orders "not right, not left, but forward." For such a party millions of citizens are (consciously or unconsciously) looking. Mr. Parrish's title "The Inadequacy of Liberalism", is a strange one. It is not Liberalism, but its supplanters that have been weighed and found wanting, and unless men return to it, frustration, fear, wretchedness and servitude will be their lot.

ELLIOTT DODDS.

## DEFENCE AND THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE

By W. T. WELLS, M.P.

THE difficulties that have beset our country ever since the end of Lend-Lease, and in particular the shortage of man-power for our essential industries, have accentuated the urgency of the tasks of economic reconstruction almost to the exclusion of all else; and since 1945, without remission, the tendency has been for economic difficulties to grow more, and not less, acute. It was thus natural that, whilst the professional staffs of the three Services conducted a survey of the lessons of the war, little interest should be shown by the public and the politicians in the affairs of the Services, except in pruning the estimates and in supervising the welfare of those who either remained in the forces as war veterans or were conscripted or recruited during the years of peace.

In 1948, because the international clouds are darker without the economic clouds being lighter, the emphasis in all Parliamentary debates on defence matters has been on the question whether our defences are effective rather than on welfare, and on the question whether money spent on the Services is being used by them to the best purpose, rather than on arguing that it should not be given to them to spend at all. Indeed, the Opposition, which formerly used to berate the Government for demobilizing too slowly—a diversion in which many of the Government's supporters took part with enthusiasm—became vehemently critical when it was admitted that, because of the speed with which this process had, in fact, been carried out, our naval strength stood this spring at its nadir. Somewhat belatedly, perhaps, Parliament came to acknowledge that it was not possible to demobilize most of the trained and experienced men from the forces and at the same time to maintain these forces in a high state of efficiency. The Minister of Defence, nothing daunted, retorted, in effect, that demobilization was a disease that it was best to contract and cure early and quickly, like measles. His critics rejoined that it would have been better had he demobilized more completely and earlier.

It is manifest that a general, and fairly profound, disquiet lay behind these political manoeuvres, and that there is a widespread uneasiness about the future of peace and war. While such a state of mind is more likely to conduce to a sound policy than is mere complacent optimism, it is not of itself, sufficient; in order to avoid a risk, a man or a nation must be aware not only of danger in general, but of the specific danger or dangers that lie ahead: which for a pacific nation, without any intent of aggression



is exceptionally difficult. It is not enough to be willing to prepare ; it is necessary to know for what the preparations are to be made.

In our military preparations it is necessary to reconcile, so far as possible, three conflicting claims. There is, first, the need of promoting economic recovery as far and as fast as possible. Our strength in war always has been, and always must be, founded on the industrial capacity and the commercial wealth of the country. As a result of the war, our industrial development has been distorted and our financial reserves dissipated. Thus, it may be argued, and often is, the first essential for building up military strength in the future is to neglect it for the present, to concentrate all our efforts on rectifying the balance of payments and on modernizing our industrial equipment, a process which must needs involve our cutting to the bone both the money and the manpower to be allotted to the fighting Services.

There is, secondly, the claim of our technical efficiency in the future. The charge that our defence ministries always prepare for the last war (or the last but one), whatever may be its justification, is very familiar. The rapidity with which new developments are taking place in the spheres of invention and technique is common knowledge ; and among the other dangers and disadvantages inherent in devoting much effort at the present time to the maintenance of a great war potential, is the virtual certainty that in a few years' time the equipment and material now produced will be outmoded and obsolete, and that by producing it we shall certainly have added to our financial burdens without, perhaps, increasing our military security. This argument, like the first, leads to the reduction of current military expenditure to the minimum, but involves, no doubt, a higher degree of expenditure both of money and, even more important in this connection, of scientific manpower, upon insuring against the risks not so much of 1948 as of 1958.

But when both these very important claims have been taken into account the fact yet remains that the perils of 1948 have to be reckoned with. Military policy is but part of the whole, a means of giving effect to the international policy of the Government of the time ; but when the world is disturbed, confidence shaken, and nerves on edge, it is a particularly important part. In addition to the age-old demands of Imperial security, sea communications, and home defence, there are commitments in Germany and Austria and increasing obligations towards France and the Benelux countries. Unless we are ready to face whatever may befall this year or next, our plans for a more distant future may be futile, and it is virtually certain that our hopes of building a strong and prosperous western Europe would have no foundation. That is conjecture ; but what is certain is that unless we appear to be strong and capable of fulfilling all obligations, the countries of western Europe will not have the faith to stand firm against the perils with which they see themselves confronted and the temptations to which these give rise.

In order to fulfil these purposes we must have strong forces, so far as our limited resources allow, of a more or less conventional pattern. As Mr. Arthur Henderson said in the debate on the Air Estimates, in words that refer directly to Air Force problems, but relate to the general problem\* :

It is sometimes suggested that it is a waste of money continuing to build new types of man-carrying aircraft when the scientists have brought push-button equipment within our view. The answer to that suggestion is two-fold. Press-button warfare as the major factor is not yet a practical reality. Even if and when the technical problems which it involves have been solved, there will still remain many air force functions which can only be carried out by manned aircraft.

While research and development are being pushed on unmanned weapons, it is clear that, concurrently with that, we must continue research and development towards the production of the aircraft, armament, and other equipment, upon which our security must depend for a number of years. . . . At the present time, when we are still exploring fields opened up by the discoveries of the war . . . it would be unwise to go into expensive large-scale production of types which would soon be out of date.

Our objective becomes fairly clear. It must be to make our present strength of respectable proportions without either destroying our prospects of economic recovery or losing sight of the absolute necessity of maintaining and staffing research establishments that are of the highest order of efficiency. To what extent are we attaining it? Or is it impossible of attainment?

Inevitably, the run-down of our forces from their wartime strength is being continued, and by March 1949, the numbers of men in the forces will have fallen still further to a total sum of 700,000 men; but of these, as Mr. Alexander pointed out in the debate on the Defence White Paper,† “only some 400,000 will be trained Regulars . . . Upon them will fall the brunt of the task of maintaining our essential commitments, and of training the intakes of men called up under the National Service Act.”‡ As the Minister of Defence rightly admitted, this constitutes “a state of unbalance” which inevitably militates against the present efficiency of the forces and raises in acute form the old problem, never satisfactorily solved before 1939, or after, of the extent to which it is reasonable and proper to call upon the hard-pressed regular forces to contribute to and take part in the training of the citizen soldier. “The essential difficulty,” as Mr. Alexander said, “is to find enough highly trained men to deal with recruits and National Service men.”

Speaking on behalf of the Opposition in the debate on the White Paper, Mr. Eden emphasized these lines of criticism. He carried the Minister of Defence's admissions about the unbalance of the Services a little farther by quoting an article published in *The New Statesman and Nation* which stated that the Army, as an effective fighting force, consisted of “two

\*Parl. Deb. House of Commons. March 4, 1948. Col. 540.

† *Statement Relating to Defence*, 1948. H.M. Stationery Office. Comd. 7372.

‡ Parl. Deb. House of Commons. March 1, 1948. Col. 42.



Infantry Divisions, one Armoured Brigade, one Parachute Brigade, and one Armoured Regiment," and he inquired whether this analysis of its active units were correct. He further stated, with reference to the *New Statesman's* figures\* : " They mean that the 534,000 men we see as our armed strength at the end of next month, the overall figure, costing us more than £300 million to maintain, represent nearly all tail and that teeth are almost non-existent."

He then developed the argument that the fact that the Government had had to reduce the number of National Service trainees by twenty-five per cent. in relation to the figure estimated in 1947 was one of several " alarming examples of the lack of a co-ordinated plan." This was, no doubt, a perfectly legitimate line of Opposition criticism, but it can be used for precisely the opposite purpose to that to which Mr. Eden applied it. It can equally well be said that it is an example of a quick adaptation to circumstances that have changed and deteriorated, circumstances that demand the maintenance of efficient forces in being as compared with concentrating a very great proportion of our active military strength on the training of recruits. The facts would yet remain that that strength was still deplorably low in relation to the numbers of men employed, but that the latter were deplorably high in relation to the total manpower of the nation and the tasks to be exacted of it.

A solution propounded by Brigadier Head, the member for Carshalton, and one of the leading spokesmen of the Opposition on defence questions, made in a debate on the adjournment of the House before Christmas, to which he reverted in the debate on the Army Estimates, was that the whole of the National Service Scheme should be recast. His suggestion was, in effect, that the period of full-time training under the National Service Act should be reduced from one year to six months, and that instead of training, or seeking to train, the National Serviceman to take his part in the regular forces, no more should be attempted than to give him a basic military training and to make him a useful member of the " military mobile columns " which it is intended to constitute as part of our Civil Defence organization ; a proposal which would have the merit both of reducing the strain of our present National Service scheme on the national economy and its interference with individual lives, and of reducing the demands on the regular forces to supply officers and N.C.O's for training, but would also involve a shortage of trained reserves in a few years' time, when many of the experienced men of 1939-1945 will have passed the age for active service. The argument put forward to counter this risk is that a future war will be short and sharp in character and that neither time nor the strategy employed will admit of the use of large armies. It is evident that quite a strong case can be made out on these lines, but there is too strong an element of speculation in it for it to be wholly convincing:

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\* Op. cit. at Col. 64. March I, 1948.

other than purely military considerations may determine the mode in which an enemy conducts war ; and clearly nothing would influence him more to pursue a particular line of action than the knowledge that his opponents relied on his not doing so. The decisive argument against Brigadier Head's suggestion is not, however, military, so much as psychological in its nature. Armed forces do not exist solely to fight : in peace, the object of their existence is, largely, to deter potential enemies and to encourage friends. The knowledge that we were about to take action that would reduce the number and the quality of our trained reserves would, on the contrary, hearten our enemies and discourage our friends. The criticism that the Minister of Defence has at his disposal " too many men, too little money " is not likely to find, amongst our friends overseas, much support for its first part.

Indeed, one of the aspects of the military policy of the Government that seems most difficult to understand is the precise proposal that gives rise to Brigadier Head's suggestion, namely the relationship of the Army to Civil Defence, and in particular " the mobile military columns to reinforce the local Civil Defence services " to which the Minister of Defence alluded \* in the debate on the Defence White Paper for this year. Neither that debate, nor the subsequent debate on Civil Defence, did much to elucidate the precise rôle of these columns, beyond that they were to be available in localities where the weight of enemy air attack had been too great for local Civil Defence resources. The great question must be, is the provision of these columns to be a major commitment for the Army, or not ? If not, the matter is hardly worth bothering about, and certainly does not justify compulsory military training for a period of six months. If it is to be so, it is an extremely serious matter indeed, since it would involve committing the most active part of the population to a purely passive rôle in the event of war, and thereby giving the enemy an outstanding victory quite irrespective of whether or not he employed weapons of mass destruction against this island. If it were decided to commit a large part of the Army to such a rôle, it would be a matter of the greatest gravity, and it is a question that should be thoroughly probed when the time comes round to discuss Service Estimates once more.

In the course of this year's debates, it was left to Captain Stephen Swingler, the Labour M.P. for Stafford, to make what was perhaps the most pungent criticism of the Government's Defence policy :

The Government have to my mind fallen between the two stools of the fulfilment of overseas commitments which they cannot really afford to fulfil, and of responding to the economic requirements of the country and its industrial recovery." †

And he continued, in words that were echoed on both sides of the House :  
When we look at the White Paper I do not feel we can say that we have in it the explanation of the overall strategic plan or of a unifying policy for the Services.

\* Parl. Deb. House of Commons. March 1, 1948. Col. 53.

† Op. cit., at Col. 85.



Mr. Crossman elaborated this line of argument, for, after stating that cuts in the forces had been made "suddenly in response to an economic emergency and not in response to the necessities of a scientifically graded run-down of the armed forces themselves," he commented: "When the size of our armed forces starts being determined by economic necessity and economic crisis, then the country is in a very dangerous situation." And of the White Paper on Defence he said, in words almost the same as Captain Swingler's: "One cannot find in it a governing principle, or a policy on which strategy is to depend."\*

Are these criticisms justified, and to what conclusions do they lead? It is always wise, even in dealing with such a subject as defence, which tends to fall outside the normal category of Party controversy, to discount to some extent criticisms of any government made by members of any opposition; but Captain Swingler and Mr. Crossman are supporters of the Government, not opponents of it, though they certainly are Members who have often taken an extremely independent line, and it is perhaps arguable that their approach to defence problems is a little doctrinaire. The common thread of criticism that ran through so many speeches is yet remarkable. There was great force in the Prime Minister's reply† that:

We must have something which is general and flexible. We must have a general scheme but we must have flexibility, looking ahead to the balance of the forces. The right hon. Gentleman‡ was right when he said we did not want something which was absolutely rigid.

But it is not a complete answer.

The truth is that, in the sphere of defence as in other departments of activity, this country has been compelled—and there was no choice but the abdication of our place as one of the world's great powers, which in its turn would involve, among many consequences that are unpredictable, the acceptance of a permanent lowering of our standards of living—to undertake commitments that were beyond our power, by ourselves alone, to meet. In the economic sphere the Marshall Plan will help to meet the deficiency; and the Marshall Plan, it is plain, has important consequences in the sphere of defence, as has the Benelux agreement. But neither the U.S.A. nor the countries of western Europe can give us all the help that is required to make our defence resources equal our defence commitments. For this purpose there must be a growing acceptance by the Dominions of military burdens in peacetime. Our hopes of framing a defence policy that is adequate to our needs and those of the world hinge on the prospects of the Imperial Conference in the autumn being able to reach effective agreement on policy in international relations, in economics, and in strategy; and it is above all to be hoped that the Dominions will realize that our great and growing commitments in western Europe are not, for them, added risks, but, rather, the best guarantee of their own security.

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\* Op. cit., at Col. 85.

† Op. cit., at Col. 156.

‡ Mr. Churchill.

## INDIA AND WORLD POLITICS

BY SIR WILLIAM P. BARTON

FOR nearly three centuries the British Navy has been unchallenged in the Indian Ocean. It has protected the coasts of India and kept the seaways open ; but for British seapower there is little doubt that Russia would have overrun India in the middle of last century. Because of it India was able to play an outstanding part in the two world wars ; still more to develop politically till she was in a position to claim her freedom.

Who will control the Indian Ocean now that Britain has given India her independence ? That is the main element in the problem of the defence of India. India herself could not build up the requisite naval power in fifty years. " The essential fact in the new situation," to quote Sirdar Pannikar, a well known Indian administrator, now India's Ambassador to China, " is that India is a maritime power with a predominance of interests in the sea. Without an alliance with Britain, India must inevitably fall into the orbit of Russia." Many Indian politicians support this view. " Russia is knocking at our door," Dr. Pattabhai Sitaramayya, a leading Congressman, told his audience recently. Another Congress leader in an address to newspaper men remarked that they had got independence without a navy to maintain it. Apart from the danger of invasion from the sea, carrier-based aircraft could work frightful devastation. " We must ally ourselves with Burma, Ceylon, Pakistan, the British Commonwealth, and France with her naval base in Madagascar. Mauritius must be brought under Indian control."

No-one can deny that India starts on her new career with very inadequate resources, in an unhappy and dangerous world. War clouds hang heavily over the western horizon. In a third world war India could not maintain neutrality. Without the support of the western powers she would almost inevitably fall a prey to Soviet Russia. Even without war there might be, if India stands alone, a danger of Russian intrusion. There is a possibility of civil war from the clash of interests of the two Dominions over Kashmir. The North West frontier in Afghanistan would naturally be involved. There would be a risk of the disturbances spreading to the Muslim Soviet republics in Central Asia. This would be Russia's opportunity.

Defence is closely allied to foreign policy. So far the India Government has not committed itself to anything definite in this sphere, despite manifest signs of impatience in some political quarters. There was indeed a full



dress debate on the question a couple of months ago in the Constituent Assembly, but it did little to clear the position. An Indian writer in an Indian newspaper described the proceedings as nugatory and depressing, not often rising above the level of a political kindergarten. Pandit Nehru was singularly indefinite. At Lake Success India, he observed, by her sympathetic attitude to oppressed nations, Indonesia, Viet-Nam, for example, had given offence to some of the great powers interested in colonial exploitation. That did not disturb his equanimity. "We are not citizens of a weak or mean country," he exclaimed, "and I think it is foolish to get frightened of the greatest powers to-day. I want to tell the world on behalf of this country that we are not frightened of the military might of this power or that." He went on to say that despite being Minister of External Affairs he was more interested in internal affairs because external affairs will follow internal affairs. For some abstruse reason he thought it necessary to stress that India stood for democracy and would, he said, resent anything opposed to the democratic concept. What he aspires to achieve is to give India the leadership of Asia, based on alliances which would include Pakistan, China, Siam, Indonesia, Malaya, Afghanistan and Persia. Australia might be admitted.

The Pandit's handling of internal affairs affords a striking illustration of the aptness of the theory of the close association of home administration with foreign policy. His intervention in Kashmir, for instance, has reacted unfavourably on the relations of India not only with Pakistan but with the Muslim States. His endeavour to absorb the historic Muslim State of the Deccan, Hyderabad, has had similar consequences, besides embittering the feelings of the forty millions of Muslims in India against their Hindu rulers. All this has weakened the military position of India. Two divisions of India's Army are, it may be noted, involved in Kashmir ; the cost has already run into several millions sterling.

In the country generally the framework of administration built up by the British still holds, though creaking here and there. The Princes have been more or less absorbed, not entirely to the satisfaction of many of them and of their people. The Sikh danger has apparently been exorcised for the time being. The growth of Communism is causing alarm, particularly in the South and in West Bengal.

Political circles in Delhi can hardly regard without anxiety the situation in the South East Pacific and the Indian Ocean areas. The Kuomintang Government in China may be friendly to Pandit Nehru and the Congress, but with China torn asunder by civil war that may last for a decade such friendship means little. Burma is riddled with Communism ; communist armies in South China might find the temptation to absorb the country too difficult to resist, especially if Russia sponsored such a movement. A port like Rangoon on the Bay of Bengal would greatly strengthen the communist position in China against the Kuomintang. Communism is rife in Malaya. With Burma in the hands of Russia and her communist

allies, India, if she stands alone, would have short shrift.

Trouble on the North West Frontier from militant Islam cannot be ruled out. For one thing the Afghan Government, disavowals notwithstanding, still casts envious eyes on Afghanistan *irridenta*—the country between the Durand line and the Indus—and might, if opportunity offered, seek to enforce its claim. It is more than likely that the Pathan tribesmen, if expelled from Kashmir and held back in the mountain hinterland by Pakistan forces, might turn and rend their co-religionists; Pathan and Panjabi Musalman have never valued each other's friendship. The result might be that tribal *lashkars*, with support from Afghanistan, would sweep the weak Pakistan forces across the Indus. That would be the end of Pakistan. But the Hindus would not rejoice. The existence of a powerful Muslim neighbour on the Indus eager for the spoils of India would be a perpetual nightmare.

Most Indian politicians would agree that the starting point for considering their foreign policy is whether India will stay in the Commonwealth or not. It is believed that some of the Cabinet Ministers in Delhi are now inclined to the view that she should do so, at any rate for several years, till she has found her feet. In any event a military alliance with Britain is proposed but its effectiveness would be greatly diminished if India should secede. On the other hand Pakistan, if Muslims can get rid of the feeling that his Majesty's Government is inclined to favour India to Pakistan's detriment, will almost certainly stay with the British. This would give the western navies bases both in the Bay of Bengal and in the Indian Ocean. If India moved in the opposite direction, the complications that would ensue, even with an alliance, would operate unfavourably on the military position.

Anglo-American sea and air power still commands the Indian and Pacific Oceans. India is the strategic centre of that vast ocean area. Bases on the Indian mainland are a pre-requisite of effective support by the western powers.

There is another equally essential element in ensuring the military security of India—complete Hindu-Muslim accord. This is not practical politics so long as India adopts a policy of aggression against Kashmir and Hyderabad. Both sides should work for a compromise acceptable to all concerned. India must realize that friendship with Pakistan will be impossible if India insists on retaining the whole of Kashmir. As to Hyderabad, there is no doubt that a square deal could be effected between India and the Nizam which would guarantee the well-being of the Hindu majority and at the same time safeguard the traditions and culture built up in seven centuries of Muslim association with the Deccan and its peoples. A settlement of the kind would be more easily brought about if India decides, at least for a term of years, to remain in the Commonwealth.



## YUGOSLAV REALITIES

BY ANNE DACIE

AT the end of the war in Yugoslavia there was only one railway line in working order : that running from Belgrade to Nish, a town in Central Serbia about 230 kilometres away. Of the pre-war 14,200 kms. of railway lines, 6,871 were destroyed, large sections of the tracks being torn up, sleepers removed and bridges and tunnels down. In 1948 not only are the old railways in use and restored, but 522 kms. of new lines have been constructed to link remote villages to their nearest market towns which hitherto lay within reach only by mountain paths, or rough stone-made roads. Moreover, in addition to the 3,573 bridges destroyed in the war nearly all have been rebuilt, including the railway suspension bridges at Belgrade and Brod across the broad Sava river, and at Belgrade and Novi Sad across the Danube ; with new ones constantly being constructed all over the country where the only previous connection across the rivers had been by ferry. Such work of rebuilding and construction in any mountainous country would be considered an achievement in so short a time.

Whatever the trend of politics in Yugoslavia after the 1939-1945 war, no plan for the reconstruction of the country was possible without first this restoration and extension of communications in a land two-thirds of which consists of mountains, a rocky limestone plateau, and forests separating the fertile plains by the Sava and the Danube from the sea. Thus, it was not until nearly two years after the war that Marshal Tito introduced his Five-Year Plan for the industrialization of a country in which seventy-five per cent. of the pre-war population had been peasants, and 800,000 only engaged as workers in mines and industries. And of these some were employed only on a part-time basis in small industrial enterprises.

I paid my first visit to Yugoslavia at the beginning of October 1945. I remained in the country until the end of June 1946, except for a five-weeks' visit to Trieste in the spring of that year at the time when the Four-Power Boundary Commission met to examine the ethnic-economic problems involved in new Italo-Yugoslav frontiers. During my stay in Yugoslavia I travelled several thousand miles, mostly in open jeeps in the winter with only a Yugoslav driver as companion or red-starred soldiers to whom we gave lifts on the way. On other occasions I went on newly-opened railways, in sleeping compartments with clean sheets and towels ;

in UNRRA lorries and staff cars ; and once in an official limousine lent for my use by the Slovene Government for a week's tour of the Yugoslav military zone near Trieste before paying my first visit to that city. Except in Macedonia, which I intended to visit later, I travelled extensively in a country of six federal units all calling themselves a Republic after the General Election of November 1945, and united in a new Yugoslav "federal democracy" working feverishly for unity and peace.

I made my journeys as a "non-political" journalist openly collecting information on economic and social problems with full approval of the Yugoslav Government. The Government helped me by translations and the loan of interpreters, and arranged for military permits which were stamped without delay. Officially I was attached to UNRRA in so far as I was commissioned by the London European Office to write reports on the reconstruction work I had seen for myself on my travels, and the country's needs. I made my journeys as I wished, though they were discussed openly with Yugoslav authorities to whom I also reported voluntarily on specific needs in areas where Yugoslav official visitors were few owing to the general lack of transport, the appalling state of the roads, and the length of time it took to cover long distances in these areas where there were as yet no telecommunications. Moreover, this was at a period when it was constantly being asserted in western circles that foreign correspondents with a British or an American passport were being denied entry and travel permits by the Yugoslav authorities and that UNRRA officials of western nationality attached to the Yugoslav UNRRA mission in Belgrade were handicapped in their work by Yugoslav officials and prevented from seeing over factories using UNRRA goods. But until May 1946—and at that time statistics were difficult to obtain even about the Yugoslavs, more of which later—I cannot recall single instances when any information on economic matters I requested was withheld, nor when I was refused admittance to hospitals, schools, universities, military messes and barracks, or the prisons, mines, and factories I asked permission to see. And I am not a member of the Communist Party, nor even a left-wing Socialist ; and neither have I any interest in politics beyond an intense curiosity in people and how they work and live. I could not even speak the languages of the new federal Yugoslavia beyond explaining in simple sentences that I was English, a journalist, and *not* a Communist ; but that I was interested as a person in the story of Yugoslav suffering, and what Yugoslavia was trying to achieve. Nowhere did I find the door shut, even in areas where I was warned by the Central Government that they might be anti-west.

How then were my travels and the welcome I received as a curious foreigner possible, in a country reported to be ruled by a ruthless dictator, grandiose and bitterly anti-west, who was a puppet of Russia ? My only introduction to Yugoslavia had been in meeting Yugoslav refugees when they first came to Italy in 1944. They came from a country of



sixteen millions pre-war of whom 1,700,000 had died during the war of liberation—in battle, through disease, because of the appalling atrocities committed by Croat Ustashi against the Serbs, with retaliation of Serbs against Croats, and in German and Italian concentration camps. My entry visa was granted in just four days. On arrival in Belgrade I was given the first private interview that Eduard Kardelj, the Vice-Premier, was said to have granted to any foreign correspondent. A known Marxist, he was reputed to be the chief political brains behind the National Front, composed it was thought of several political parties. With the aid of an interpreter I spoke with him for over two hours, and openly in front of him wrote down his answers, an action which seemed impolite at the time but which was the only way to make quite sure I remembered what he said.

Yugoslavia, he declared, was intensely proud and independent. Yugoslavs had fought for liberation, and they would fight for peace. It was a country of smallholders, many of them backward and illiterate, without improvement in their mode of life for over a thousand years. During their liberation struggle they had evolved their own form of Communism, though actual members of the Communist Party were comparatively few. Their Communism meant a communal life, arising from the necessities of war and the necessities of peace. In such a country work must be shared by all if progress was to be made in districts which to western eyes might recall the Middle Ages. "Think back," he said, "to your own history in Britain, and imagine what it was like in England, Scotland, and Wales when they first became united; and ask yourself if border incidents were always sponsored by the first united Parliament. Then you might understand Yugoslavia; as you, also, belong to a race known to be proud and independent. And can you imagine," he asked, "your country brooking any interference as to whether you received outside help in your work of reconstruction?"

M. Kardelj was emphatic that Yugoslavia was not dictated to by Russia within its National Front, though many of its new reforms were patterned on the Russian model, and Yugoslavs had natural ties with the Russians in the fact that they were Slav. But Yugoslavia equally wanted friendship and trade relations with Britain and America, as with Italy, and to be at peace with its neighbours in order to achieve that stability which alone could bring prosperity to the country, to the Balkans and to Central Europe. Yugoslavia, he went on, had many difficulties and had not yet decided to what extent it would nationalize industry, though it was obvious it must nationalize communications, mines, springs and forestry. The restoration of industry was of primary importance to make needed commodities and to resume foreign trade; and as Yugoslavia's natural wealth lay largely in minerals and timber, the country needed technical schools for the young to encourage study in mining as well as forestry and engineering. Yugoslavia did not want collectivization of its farming

lands ; Yugoslavia was fiercely individualistic, and collectivization was not appropriate to its needs. It had its own system of " co-operatives " known as the "*zadruga* ", which had worked successfully for many years, only needing to be extended. Land reform was necessary for a redistribution of land to give opportunity to peasants in the devastated and poorer districts to farm now, if they wished, on fertile soil ; though many preferred their native surroundings, cultivating crops in small pockets of soil to be found in the rocky mountains of Montenegro, Hercegovina, and the Lika district of Croatia, where anything more than a hand-drawn plough would scrape the soil away. Choice lay with the individual ; but opportunity for choice should be given to all, plus the loan of tools, and education including model farms for instruction. Unity was the watch-word and " the land to those who till it " the slogan for Yugoslavia's own form of democracy.

Yugoslavia wanted peace with its neighbours ; it had suffered so much from war. " But suspicion dies hard in a country so torn and devastated as we are ; and self-control takes time to learn where passions are easily expressed. War might best be compared to an illness in which the convalescence is the hardest part." There was deep appreciation of UNRRA ; but from experience Yugoslavia had learnt to fear the perils of exploitation.

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During my travels in Yugoslavia I spoke to many priests, teachers, doctors, lawyers, miners, soldiers, industrial workers, and peasants working with their hand-drawn ploughs on poor *poljes*. Comparatively few acknowledged themselves as members of the Communist Party, though nearly all favoured the reforms being introduced by the National Front provided they did not infringe too sternly on private independence. But all expressed confidence in Marshal Tito, and spoke of him in the same way that British people speak of Winston Churchill. He was their great war leader : a man who gave them courage once, and would give them courage again. With a pass to attend all the Parliamentary sessions whenever I was in Belgrade—except in June 1946—I had ample opportunity to study the Marshal of Yugoslavia ; and I can only say that even on the days when the New Republic and the New Constitution were proclaimed he appeared singularly indisposed in public to encourage personal applause, play to the gallery, or waste too much time. Tito, the peasants told me in Bosnia as well as in the Slovene Littoral, where he was invited as the guest of honour at the first Hunters' Supper to be held " in freedom after twenty-five years of Fascism " stands not only for the man who with personal courage brought liberation from invaders, but also as the symbol of encouragement to eradicate ignorance and illiteracy and establish independence " for the unity of all South Slavs." Simple peasants are as a rule honest when they tell you these things ; as they are quick to notice guile in a stranger.



I have to-day a moderate-sized suit-case full of information of an economic-social character which I collected and took out of Yugoslavia. In that depressing summer in Belgrade of 1946, when one felt that an iron hand was clamping down on liberty, my papers were certainly "borrowed"; but they were always returned, and not one page is missing. And looking through that suit-case I see that the Yugoslav work of reconstruction must have been prodigious; it was the genius of sheer determination defeating laws of logic. But then I had been down a mine shaft at Idria and had seen the difficulties of mining mercury in a half-demolished mine of which all the maps had been lost; I had crossed safely a hand-built wooden suspension bridge over a deep ravine not far from Mt. Durmitor in Hercegovina, to the cheers of the Yugoslavs for the Austrian prisoners-of-war who had built it; and I had met a Serb woman feeding three babies as well as her own, black-eyed Hungarian twins and a fat German child on the flat Yugoslav-Hungarian frontier in a Children's Home scrubbed clean with cold water in the winter at a time when fuel consisted of maize-stalks—and it is only honest to say I was impressed.

It is small wonder that the Yugoslavs are keen on the Five-Year Plan which is going to electrify the whole country, drain marshlands, improve rice yield, plant fruit trees to prevent soil erosion, and encourage potatoes, wheat, sheep, and pigs to multiply to three times the pre-war levels, though keeping the cattle and the coarse-grained crops as they were. They have plenty of iron ore in the country to manufacture steel for locomotives, machine tools, and tractors, if they can rebuild the furnaces of the steel-works and procure the necessary coke which at present they get from Poland. Oil they must have, and their late friends, the Albanians, are not at present sending the oil for which they have already paid two milliard dinars in credit, as well as giving a large loan to assist Albania in her troubles. Money they need, in a country which three years ago had seven foreign "soft" currencies in circulation. The job then was to stabilize the "dinar".

On June 4, 1948, Yugoslavia signed the first contract by which it is selling Britain £3,750,000 worth of timber, more than one-third of which is in hard wood. It is expected that Yugoslavia will use its sterling on engines and engineering tools. There is talk of a loan from America and the unfreezing of Yugoslav gold; but it is to be hoped that if this is so the loans will be made unconditionally, for pride works best when trusted.

## A LETTER FROM GERMANY

BY WILLI HOMMEN

VERY much has already been written and told by foreign and German observers about Germany, and yet there always exists wrong opinions in other countries on the actual situation. This is felt by the Germans when they get foreign newspapers or when receiving mail from friends abroad.

The published articles are from foreign observers and from the Germans themselves. Regarding the former, it should be pointed out that the foreigner always observes the German situation through the lenses of his own national glasses, thus taking the measure by comparing his country with Germany. Each correspondent will come to Germany for a limited time, touring various places that are of special interest to him and speaking to authoritative people. He will hereby have a one-sided picture impressed in his mind though he may sometimes talk with parts of the population. To obtain a better impression, the correspondent ought to have been living for a long period, perhaps years, in the country and so to get a personal experience on the life in Germany before, during, and after the war in the different stages. It would seem natural that the members of the occupation power should have made a better look into the people's life since they are to live in Germany for rather a long time. They have in no way the personal contact with the population which is required to acquire this knowledge, the more as they chiefly deal with the responsible men which have partly been given their office by the occupation authorities.

Finally, there are the reports of the Germans themselves. You will find them in the editorials of the dailies and in other publications. Very often you will find the situation put down clearly although it may have been pressed through a party-political filter. But these publications very seldom find the way into the foreign press, and if so, chiefly in extracts only. If these extracts are torn out of the context, they have a misrepresentative effect.

How does the man in the street in Germany take the news of the day and what does he think about it? I will try to explain how the average German of to-day regards the economical and political situation of his country. To jump into the present-day life: "Will there be a war?" is anxiously asked by everybody. There are first the great pessimists who count on its outbreak every hour and who have nearly no mind to under-



take anything as they fear that all they can do will be in vain. They are very often those who have lost all their belongings and beloved by the war and its aftermath. In this category belong the huge masses of expellees now pouring into the western zones, having lost their kinsfolk not knowing whether and where to find them.

These people soon pass into another category : those with a completely indifferent mind, nothing can bother them at all. What can they lose now ? Their bit of life ? This had long enough hung on a thin thread which they don't care if it breaks.

The next category are the curious sort who, one might say, are longing for the war. If possible they would take up arms at once and go fighting, and every day that no shooting starts yet, they think lost. "Alas, militarism", every foreigner now thinks, "it's always deeply rooted in the Germans ! " No, you cannot place them on the same level. Almost all of them are Germans who were forcibly driven off their homes and shifted into the western zones under most cruel circumstances. Long after the end of hostilities the civilian population was maltreated and discriminated against, and they saw what powers were hidden behind the acting individuals. To these people it became evident they would not be likely to return to their homeland in which generation after generation had grown up. And so they became willing to conquer their land by force if necessary. Don't tell these people what cruelties the Germans committed during the war for they have felt on their own bodies the same sufferings if not worse and they point out that the present victors had always announced they would shrink from such cruelties.

The last group does not think of war, leastways not in the near future. They mostly are the people with a clear and calm thinking which has not yet been so strongly affected by the recent developments that they have lost their commonsense. They weigh the relations between the east and the west and they conclude that none of those powers is yet able to wage a chaotic war. In this connection the question is often heard how the western powers could be so short-sighted as to come so far with the Soviets who are slinging more and more obstacles on the former's path. It is true that the news on armament in the countries of the western democracies, reorganization of the general compulsory service in the forces in the U.S.A., etc., has contributed to this opinion of the Germans.

The chief problem of the Germans is the trouble of their everyday life and what they will eat tomorrow and no other thoughts can come up besides this one. That the German people have not been driven into the arms of Communism is due first to the war. There is hardly anybody who holds the Soviet Union the paradise of man. Too many had been in that country during the war as soldiers and they could compare conditions there with their own. Still more, the German population are kept away from communist tendencies by thinking of the prisoners of war still living in Russia. Why are no more P.O.W's discharged, asks the German

and why is there no postal connection with our prisoners there? And when the Germans hear the cynicism with which the leading men of the Soviet Union speak about that problem, even the last will lose his spirit to join a party that approves of a régime like that, the more as the Germans had felt themselves what the methods of dictatorship are like.

Nobody in Germany is speaking of a food crisis any longer since a crisis is normally regarded as a temporary state, but no end can yet be seen in the shortage of food that is below the subsistence level. The man in the street blamed the occupation powers for carrying on a starvation policy, and the good will, very often broadcast by press and radio, was termed hypocrisy, for nearly none of the promises given was kept. Just one example: every year since 1946 the Netherlands offered surplus vegetables and fruits to Germany which amounted to many thousands of tons, and which are very badly needed by the German population. Negotiations between the occupation officers and the Dutch authorities were started each time and the offer was rejected because the costs were too high, and so about half of Holland's vegetable produce had to go rotten. Last year, many Dutch vegetable producers crossed the border on the Lower Rhine and sold off the vegetables at a loss to the local German population in order to avoid its perishing. Early this year, fresh negotiations were entered on the same subject and after several contradictory statements the papers announced officially that an arrangement for import of Dutch vegetables had been made and the Germans in the towns felt a little easier remembering the recent years with hardly any vegetables on their tables. In the first weeks of May the Germans in the western zones got to know that General Clay had forbidden, without further explanation, the delivery of German industrial goods and chemicals in return for Dutch vegetables and the Dutch supplies that had meanwhile started, were stopped at once. Even those who, after the armistice, believed in the constructive policy of occupation powers and kept on to convince their countrymen of it, started doubting themselves.

Last, but not least, the dismantling programme was announced in Germany and hundreds of thousands feared to lose their jobs. As a complete contradiction to the dismantlings there were the plans for the reconstruction of the German economy the victor powers aimed at, and nearly nobody in Germany believed in its realization. The German standard of living sank steadily. Nobody will hear anything about calories which, by the mysterious calculations of the powers-to-be, are always said to stay on the same level in spite of constant reductions of the rations. The less goods and food there are to distribute, the more bureaucracy is prospering.

The next stage was that the Marshall Plan was announced and western Germany was to be included in this aid from the United States. Strong voices were loud against the ERP from the communist-controlled east



zone and the unity of Germany and the efforts that should be made to achieve it were the nucleus of their arguments. Of course, the communists in the western zones made the same argument their mouthpiece. The population accepted the Marshall Plan with very mixed feelings and most of the people had not the right confidence in it. The masses had been too often disappointed to believe in real help once again. They said : ' If they give us more to eat and we need not hunger any longer, it will be all right. But why send us machines and other industrial goods out of this credit ? The masses cannot comprehend that these things should help to bring the devastated German economy on its own feet again. ' For,' they say, " if we can keep our own industrial capacity and the dismantlings will not be undertaken, we shall soon be capable of making those things all by ourselves. But now we shall always be debtors to America and for centuries we shall have to pay for our debts beside the reparations."

All these thoughts are expressed by a people which grew more and more embittered in the post-war years and hunger is certainly not the remedy to reduce the consequences of that bitterness. Even at first thought nobody had the opinion that the Marshall Plan was to be introduced in Germany for the sake of humanity and everybody was well conscious of its political significance. As little as Communism enjoys the favours of the German people, many voices favoured the consideration that a larger share of communist votes in the elections would have made the occupation powers think, compelling them to grant a better food situation to prevent a further spreading of Communism.

In April of this year the fat ration was a little increased (the meat ration was reduced to one quarter) and more increases were suggested for the months to come. These promises have actually been fulfilled and instantly, the confidence in the promises grew. Step by step the opinion gets space that the Marshall Plan might mean an aid to our economy. It is now up to the policy of the occupation powers to do their best that this little spark of hope will not be extinguished. Many Germans think that their country has been chosen for the outlet of non-marketable goods and they have some proof of this. There were, for instance, more than twenty million yards of textiles released by Military Government for sale to the population. Textiles are very very short in this country and people do not care so much what kind they wear, if only they can get them. Those twenty-odd million yards are a light cotton fabric and designed for Congo Negroes, with lion heads and the like. The Negroes did not accept them and, since they cannot be sold anywhere else, they were shipped to Germany, where the fabrics had to be manufactured by order of the occupying powers. This and other things are items the German looks at resentfully.

But still other problems are in store for the Germans. The currency reform has been discussed for years. On Friday, June 18, at night,

Military Government announced the Currency Reform Law to come into force on the 20th. Long queues were lined up before the banks on Saturday to pay in their cash or to draw the money necessary for exchange of the "*per capita* quota" of sixty marks for Sunday.

On Sunday every German was as poor as his neighbour and he possessed forty marks of the new currency and did not know how long they were supposed to pay for his living. Although it had been made known that wages and prices would be kept unaltered, nobody knew when the employers and enterprises would get money to pay their employees. Still on the same Sunday night the new black market prices noted  $\frac{1}{2}$  mark for an American cigarette; a pound of butter ten to twenty marks, then 240 old marks, etc. On Monday one could read from the papers that the rationing of household goods, motor cars, bicycles, bicycle tyres, sewing machines, wireless sets, was suspended. At first nobody could grasp the idea but the prices and the little money at hand clearly showed the relation. Suddenly the shops were full of goods and despite the little money, many things were bought and the shops had a relatively good turnover. Chiefly china and similar things were purchased and many people thought that, once they got their first wages they would actually be in a position to buy the most necessary things. The great question, however, is whether the production can keep pace and whether the full shops with the long-stocked goods are not perhaps a bluff. On the other hand, there will be so little money in circulation that not many things can be bought that offer and want may possibly find a certain normal way.

But what about the savings deposits of the individual? A corresponding devaluation will still be considered and it is not yet certain whether a part of the accounts will be issued at all. At any rate, the head-quota which will be sixty marks soon, will be deducted from the account in proportion; for instance, a family of four persons gave 240 old marks (RM) and received in exchange 160 new marks (DM), the remaining 80 DM later. If that family has a banking account of 3,000 RM, 2,400 RM will be deducted at once because of the head-money given. A person who had no money at all on the exchange day could get the old money from a relief organization without binding himself to repay anything and practically, he gets his head quota presented.

When the currency reform came into force the economic enterprises were bare of any cash and nothing has yet been decided what will happen to the old money stock of the firms. First of all they are dependent on banking credits to comply with their liabilities at all. Many a firm can no longer keep open under these circumstances and an unemployment figure of about one million was indicated which is said to be temporary only.

In conformity with the currency reform the tax reform is an urgent presupposition if the former is to succeed. In effect the tax will be cut by a third on average in a medium income group. By the end of the year



1948 a *Lastenausgleich*, balancing of charges, is scheduled which is intended to benefit those parts of the population who have lost everything by the war at the expense of those who could keep their goods, and the opinion is put in the foreground that possession of valuable goods in the present times is a grace. Details about the *Lastenausgleich* have still to be worked out.

Directly after the announcement of the currency reform in the German west zones, communist voices were loud. The system introduced is fresh water to the communists' mills and posters announce that the little man has again been fooled and that by this coup the capitalists have saved their share. As a direct measure the communists demand a twenty per cent. increase of wages and protection from dismissal for six months and that the property of the trade unions will not be affected by the money reform.

As the Russians did not accept the currency reform for their zone too, the zones are foreign countries as to their exchange and the inter-zonal traffic was stopped as soon as the western German currency was introduced to avoid a flooding of the Soviet zone with the old money. But some days later Marshal Sokolovsky issued an order for a money reform in his zone. But no new bank notes are issued and the Germans can exchange certain amounts of their money to other notes having a special coupon applied to them. The exchange rates are higher than in the western zones and also the savings will not be so affected. The Soviet currency reform was not introduced in the Soviet zone alone but was intended for the whole of Berlin too in opposition to the fact that Berlin is governed by four powers. The Russians insist that Berlin is practically a part of their zone. The natural consequence was that the western powers introduced the western currency also in their Berlin sectors and now there exist two different currencies in one and the same city. Can anybody imagine what that means to the population, their supply of goods and the working of the economy?

And as a result what will the future fate of Germany be in the political and the economic field and can international diplomacy ever untangle this knot that has been so intricately made?

## PRIVATE BILL LEGISLATION

BY F. N. KEEN

THE leading characteristic of the Private Bill system is its combined use of legislative and judicial processes in the attainment of its objects and the solution of the problems with which it deals. A Private Bill\*, after passing through the allotted procedure in each House of Parliament, emerges as a Private Act which has just the same dominating force in our body of laws as a General or Public Act. The meaning of any of its provisions, if disputed, may have to be interpreted by a court of law, but the validity of any provision of the Act cannot be challenged in a court any more than that of a provision of a Public Statute. The function of a Private Bill, however, is to deal with the interests and concerns not of the people generally throughout the whole country but with those of particular bodies or persons or particular localities, and for that reason it is subjected by Parliament, at one stage in its passage, to a procedure of a semi-judicial character which ensures that the evidence and contentions of parties specially affected shall have an opportunity of being heard, and an endeavour shall be made to protect private or particular interests against risk of injustice before the Bill becomes an Act and is thus part of the law of the land.

Private Bills are not introduced, like Public Bills, on the motion of Members of Parliament in the House of Commons or Peers in the House of Lords, but on petition by the parties outside Parliament desiring their enactment, and those parties act throughout the proceedings as promoters of the Bills. The procedure to be complied with is laid down in Standing Orders of each House of Parliament and ensures that soon after the Private Bill and the petition for it are deposited in Parliament due notice of the objects of the Bill shall be given by public advertisement and also by individual notices to certain Government departments and other bodies and to owners, lessees and occupiers of properties specially affected. Officers and a committee in each House are appointed for the purpose of ensuring that the Bills are duly examined and certified as complying with the Standing Orders or as meriting a special dispensation by the House from such compliance.

A Private Bill goes through the same stages in each House as a Public

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A Private Bill must not be confused with a Public Bill introduced by a private Member of Parliament (as distinguished from members of the Government). Such Bills (the practice of introducing which has been suspended since the beginning of the war owing to pressure of Government business) are sometimes loosely and inaccurately referred to as Private Bills.



Bill : first reading, second reading, committee stage, report stage and third reading ; but all except the committee stage are generally only formal.

The committee stage is quite different in character from that of a Public Bill. Instead of being taken in the House itself or a large Standing Committee, it is taken before a small committee which is specially enjoined to act impartially. Parties claiming to be injuriously affected by the Bill are allowed to deposit petitions in opposition, and parties desiring that the Bill shall not be altered as a result of opposition may deposit petitions against alterations. If there are no petitions against a Bill it goes to a Committee on Unopposed Bills for hearing. If there are petitions against it the hearing is before a committee of four Members in the House of Commons or five Peers in the House of Lords. The committee hear evidence and arguments on behalf of the promoters and the petitioners in much the same way as the parties to a cause are heard in a court of law. The committee first deal with the case for the Bill as a whole and its broad objects as disclosed in the preamble. If they decide that the preamble is proved, they go on to consider the clauses of the Bill and hear any opposition that is directed specially against particular clauses or in favour of the insertion of new clauses or amendments or protective provisions, the promoters of course being also heard. When the committee have completed their task and decided whether the preamble is or is not proved and whether or not any amendments should be made or new clauses inserted, the chairman of the committee reports the Bill to the House with a statement of what the committee have decided about it.

A Private Bill must be distinguished from a quasi-private type known as a Hybrid Bill. This is a Bill which is introduced as a Public Bill, generally on behalf of the Government, but to which, because it affects the private rights of particular parties or a particular section of the community, the Standing Orders relative to Private Bills are applicable. After second reading it is referred to a select committee, where its merits are inquired into and discussed in the same way as if it were a Private Bill. Justice is thus done between the State and the particular subjects affected by the measure.

With its procedure for full and impartial consideration of controversial issues raised by the proposals of the Bill, and with the character of unchallengeable validity attaching to the resulting Act, it is obvious that a Private Bill is an instrument by means of which the carrying out of many activities of public service or control may usefully be provided for and local problems and controversies of many types may conveniently and advantageously be thrashed out and brought to a definite and final solution.

Here are some of the main objects for which the procedure of Private Bill Legislation has been used in the past :

1. The alteration of the areas for exercise of the powers or jurisdic-

tions of local authorities or local tribunals or other bodies.

2. The conferring upon local authorities of powers of local government, control and administration in excess of those conferred by the general law.

3. The authorization of joint or co-operative action by different local authorities, statutory companies or other bodies, or by local authorities in conjunction with other bodies.

4. The setting up and carrying on of undertakings such, for example, as railways, harbours, gas-works or water-works, for which special powers or privileges are needed, such as powers for the compulsory purchase of private lands, the compulsory levy of rates or tolls, or interference with public highways.

5. The creation of statutory companies or special corporate bodies (such, for example, as a Sea Defence Commission, the Taf Fechan Water Board or the Railway Clearing House) or other authorities, and their equipment with special powers necessary for carrying on public undertakings or exercising other public functions.

6. The granting to individuals or corporate bodies of power to carry on activities which might be liable to restraint as nuisances under the general law, or to exercise other privileges which, in the absence of special authorization, would contravene or go beyond the general law.

7. The authorization of the construction and maintenance of works that have been constructed without necessary authority.

8. The sanctioning of agreements for purposes which would not be valid under the general law, or the giving of legal effect to compromises agreed to between parties whose legal rights or obligations are in dispute in cases where legal force cannot be given to such compromises without special legislation.

9. The compulsory revision of the terms and conditions of agreements, or arrangements, rights or obligations, which have become out of date or inequitable through lapse of time or change of circumstances.

10. The alteration of the legal rights and interests of holders of shares or stock or debentures, or other parties concerned in a company or other corporate or jointly owned undertaking or fund.

11. The re-organization of the constitutions or financial arrangements of local public bodies or undertakings.

12. The change or adjustment of conditions or situations involving injustice to particular individuals, corporate bodies or localities.

The Private Bill system has been in operation for centuries ; but in modern times, and particularly in the years that have elapsed since the outbreak of the 1914-1918 war, the extent of its activities has been greatly contracted through the conferring upon government departments of authority to grant, by Orders, many powers which previously would have been granted by Private Bill, and through the development of a



tendency to amalgamation of the undertakings of companies and the areas of local authorities, with consequent reduction of the number of bodies wanting to promote or oppose or seek protection against Private Bills.

Those who have had much experience of the working of the system will probably agree that the proceedings of Private Bill committees have commanded very general satisfaction on the part of promoters and petitioners with whose cases they have dealt. This is due partly to the fact that their decisions have been generally recognized as based on justice and commonsense. It is also partly due to the fact that the proceedings are conducted in public. The publicity inspires confidence that justice is being done. The parties realize that the issues submitted to the committee are being fully examined and fairly decided by a tribunal whose decision, openly and promptly given, spells finality. Even defeated parties will often go away feeling and saying that they have had a fair run for their money.

A legislative instrument which has proved so satisfactory in actual practice ought not to be allowed to fall into disuse, and it seems desirable therefore to consider whether any opportunities present themselves for an extension of its sphere of usefulness to new fields.

The schemes of nationalization which have recently been passed through Parliament must surely give rise to many difficulties, injustices and uncertainties in the application of their provisions to the varieties of circumstances upon which they will have to operate. One can imagine that many cases will arise where difficulties due to local circumstances can only be cleared away by special enactments, for which Private Bill legislation will be the appropriate procedure.

There are likely also to be local difficulties needing to be smoothed out in a similar way in relation to works constructed or operations carried out under wartime emergency orders which have ceased to be in force.

One consequence of the extension of the powers of bureaucratic inquiry and decision has been that dissatisfaction has arisen in many quarters both with decisions arrived at and with methods of procedure adopted by Departments or their officers. Some remedy seems clearly needed for meeting this situation. There have been suggestions put forward at one time or another in favour of the creation of an independent administrative tribunal to which contentious cases of this kind would be referred, or to which there could be an appeal from a departmental decision. Some solution of this kind may ultimately emerge, but, as matters now stand, in cases where large interests are at stake and there are grounds for serious dissatisfaction a remedy might well be sought by means of a Private Bill.

In the grave times of economic crisis through which we are passing there is need to take advantage of all possibilities of providing improved facilities for helping farmers to secure increased home production of food on an economic basis, and thus to reduce the need for import of food. It

may well be that some local authorities might be able to help in the provision of such facilities, and that the obtaining of special powers by Private Bill procedure would be necessary in order to enable such help to be given. For example, where a market is carried on by the local authority in a provincial town surrounded by an agricultural area, the local authority might be empowered to organize and run a service of motor vehicles which would systematically collect from the farms and villages in the surrounding area agricultural produce, and convey it to the market for sale, or to the town railway station for re-conveyance elsewhere by rail, and also convey to the surrounding farms and villages goods purchased at the market and agricultural machinery and materials needing to be drawn in from the town or through the town railway station.

A market authority might also be empowered to provide premises, apparatus, services and other facilities for assisting the surrounding agricultural community in regard to the storing, preservation, grading and packing of agricultural produce, the testing of the quality of agricultural materials and products, and kindred matters.

The existence of railway level crossings in many localities up and down the country has long been a subject of public complaint and an obstruction to business and economic interests. Attempts have often been made without success to secure the substitution of bridges or tunnels through sharing of the cost between railway companies and local authorities. As traffic has increased, the necessity for removal of these obstructions has become more pressing, and now the great need of the country for speeding up the production and movement of goods makes the matter more urgent. It may also not unreasonably be thought that the substitution of the British Transport Commission for the railway companies should facilitate the successful conclusion of arrangements for the sharing of the cost of the abolition of many level crossings. Private Bill legislation would probably prove the appropriate means for confirming arrangements of this kind and meeting any difficulties involved.

In the various trading estates that have been established in different localities the production and distribution of goods has been facilitated by the provision of special apparatus and arrangements for communications and conveyance of traffic between factories and roads, railways and canals and for loading and unloading of goods, and otherwise serving industrial needs. Cases may well arise in some towns where such arrangements for affording assistance to industry could be provided in particular localities by local authorities, if the local authorities could be equipped with the necessary powers. The Jarrow Corporation Act 1939 is an example of the way in which a sympathetic local authority was able, by a Private Act, to get itself into a position to give exceptional assistance to local industry at a time of great trade depression and unemployment. The Act gave special powers to the corporation, subject in most cases to the consent of the Minister of Health, to promote much needed industrial development



in the borough by the provision of sites and premises for the establishment or extension of industries, trades and businesses, the laying out and development of lands thus acquired, and the grant of easements, rights and privileges in, under or over such lands. The corporation was also empowered to advance money to purchasers or lessees of lands for enabling or assisting them to erect buildings or to adapt, alter, extend or improve existing buildings. Special powers were also included for extinguishment of public rights of way over lands acquired for industrial development purposes; for reinstatement of owners of property acquired; for payment of allowances to persons displaced; for establishment of information bureaux, and for advertisement of the commercial advantages of the borough. Valuable help in the preparation and passage of the Bill was given by the late Miss Ellen Wilkinson, who was then the Member of Parliament for Jarrow and very sympathetic with the difficulties and distresses into which the town had fallen.

We are told that one of the troubles from which this country, and not this country alone, is going to suffer for some years to come is a great shortage of capital. If that is correct investors are likely to be especially critical of the credentials of companies whose capital they are asked to subscribe, and there may be some extension of the use of the statutory company as the body to be entrusted with the ownership and control of a large and important undertaking. The statutory company, with its incorporation by special Act of Parliament and its regulation under the familiar provisions of the Companies Clauses Acts, has always held a high place in the hierarchy of joint stock companies.

Education is another matter for consideration. There have been problems arising in recent years in connection with the position and powers of universities and colleges and the objects of charitable trusts for educational purposes. Special arrangements about such matters have in some cases been sanctioned by Private Bill.

At the time of the passing of the Education Act 1944 through Parliament there were many expressions of doubt, especially among the non-county boroughs and the larger urban districts, as to whether the arrangements for confining the status of local education authorities to the county councils and county borough councils and the provisions regulating the delegation of functions by county councils were the wisest possible in the interests of educational efficiency. Now that there has been some actual experience of the working of the Act, it may well be that in particular cases it may appear that better arrangements could be organized.

The 1947 Report of the Local Government Boundary Commission, issued in March, shows that that Commission had received much criticism from the "divisional executives" and in some cases from county councils, of the working of the system of delegation under the 1944 Act.

The Private Bill system affords a suitable method for meeting exceptional circumstances in particular cases in education, as it has long done in the

past in public health and building regulation and other branches of local government administration. Thus, if a case should arise where a particular local authority or a group of local authorities are satisfied, and feel able to prove by evidence, that their area or combined areas, as the case may be, ought, in the interests of educational efficiency, to be administered in a different way or with larger powers or discretions than are available to them under the general law and the established system of delegation, there seems no technical reason or consideration of principle to interfere with their seeking authority from Parliament by Private Bill for the setting up of a special régime or the grant of powers for satisfying the local need.

In all these possible new fields of operation, which have been cited for purposes of illustration, Private Bill legislation is a convenient instrument because it is highly flexible and provides a direct, complete and effective means of doing just the thing that is needed to meet the special circumstances of a particular case.

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## GOLDEN ORIOLE

BY RUTH TOMALIN

Over the Golden Falls  
 an oriole whistled down the tender wind.  
 The copper oak-leaves rippled to his calls ;  
 the listener lay still,  
 drinking the arrant sunlight, honey-skinned  
 already with the hot suns of April,  
 and dreamed an oriole like a daffodil.

The golden water fell  
 in a soft prelude to the perfect note,  
 when, peal on peal, a burning villanelle,  
 extravagant as a flamingo, shy,  
 touching the mandolin of his sweet throat,  
 the legendary oriole went by  
 winging to love under a delicate sky.

The quiet woods remember and they quiver . . .  
 as winds awaken whispers in a well  
 the haunted forest hears a low flute cry,  
 most glorious and pitiful, the knell  
 rung in that high noon for a passing-bell  
 by the last oriole, to the Golden River.



## THE WRITER AND THE GUN

BY ROLAND MATHIAS

**I**N 1914 the last stanchions of Victorian existence snapped off short. An England which had not really recognized that its industrial potential had been outstripped since 1880 by Germany and the United States had to face the fact of war. But the crash was not mainly economic. The moral fervour of Gladstone's radicalism had been replaced, in any case, by the Fabian Society's belief in an economic solution. The non-conformist conscience, in retreat since Queen Victoria's death, was lost among new terms which it had not time to comprehend. Lies and diplomacy rose up like a wave and the middle class, already swimming desperately in a tide of sentimental materialism, went down. The body, when recovered, was unrecognizable. Only a litter of habits and conventions on the beach reminded the curious of a former civilization.

In 1939, on the other hand, no one was lost who had not been torpedoed once already. Idealists had learned at Geneva and Guernica that the accepted international values were those of might. Pacifists were less sneered at, but more from nerves and uncertainty than goodwill. England had never really settled down since 1920, and the alternative values were ready long before the air-raid shelters were up.

1914, then, was a direct break: 1939 was not. The writer may, in rare cases, create his own environment; usually he reflects it. In 1918 it was for him to complete, if he could, the broken arcs; if not, to shape his writing towards their overwhelming question-mark. In 1945 the fact of war, to an Englishman, had not been worse than his apprehensions of it. He had had twenty-five years' experience of doubt and self-examination, only dimly remembering, if at all, settled social and moral values. Here and there, perhaps, a young writer came out of the wood in which his parents had taken refuge and scanned the ideological distances. But he was advancing over essentially the same ground, expecting the same battle, ready.

Post-war literature has only significance as a class of writing if the impact of war is specifically considered. Plainly, then, one must leave on one side developments in technique. War may affect a writer's whole view of life and therefore the material about which he chooses to write. In turn, of course, he may feel that new material demands a new technique. But this is more than one step and in a primary consideration of the impact of the two wars on English writing only one step can be made.

What moved a man to write his hopes, his fears, his teachings, his omens in 1918 ? And what in 1945 ? Why did he really want to write at all ?

The first answer one may give for poets is shock. The horror of the trench-fighting in 1917 and 1918 both loosened new tongues and stopped many mouths for ever. To Wilfred Owen the poetry was " in the pity " : to Siegfried Sassoon it lay, bitter and caustic and uncompromising, in the appalling sacrifice of the common man and the complacency of " brass-hats " : Rosenberg and Robert Nichols were aware, for the first time, of unity between man and man : Edward Thomas and Julian Grenfell were probably happier than they had ever been, their responsibilities lost in the general risk. But the impetus died. The poets of war perished in battle or lived on in silence. Those who went on writing, like Robert Bridges, tried to create a philosophy of beauty which might make picturesque the ruins of a broken society. Or else, like James Elroy Flecker, dying of tuberculosis, they mingled east and west, bringing Greece into Gloucestershire. Beauty was timeless, of Painswick and Damascus, Dover and Parnassus, of saint and statue, but rarely of a recognizable England of field and hedgerow, much less of slump and General Strike. The last unreal glow was dying on the world of Kipling and Hilaire Belloc : it was useless to be strident with a tub in the shadows. England was not the same and even poets knew it. Society was unhealthy, breaking in boils and tumours. One literary tradition and consciousness was at an end ; there was no means of telling if the travail were of death only, or of birth as well.

T. S. Eliot was the poet most aptly to describe this bared society :

What are the roots that clutch, what branches grow  
Out of this stony rubbish ? Son of Man,  
You cannot say , or guess, for you know only  
A heap of broken images, where the sun beats,  
And the dead tree gives no shelter, the cricket no relief,  
And the dry stone no sound of water. Only  
There is shadow under this red rock  
(Come in under the shadow of this red rock)  
And I will show you something different from either  
Your shadow at morning striding behind you  
Or your shadow at evening rising to meet you ;  
I will show you fear in a handful of dust.

This was The Waste Land. Outside of a man there was nothing axiomatic, nothing to be counted on. No principles, few conventions even, only the degradation of what had once been great.

Thus far into the desert with the serious. Some, however, never travelled at all, but sat playing with sticks in the dust, taking occasional swigs from bottles of fizz they had with them, laughing and remembering the oases. Somerset Maugham was there, drawing *The Circle*, and Noel Coward, drinking grenadine and writing, writing. For some it had all happened so long ago. E. M. Forster's novel, *A Passage to*



India, written in 1912, shows clearly the shock English society was to receive. This was not England after war, but India, India suffering under caste and snobbery, India with its teeming millions and many religions. But the blow it administered to Christianity and humanism was identical; not in this case concentrated evil, but concentrated suffering, needless and removable. Mrs. Moore, an elderly well-meaning Englishwoman and a practising Christian, pays a visit to the Marabar caves:

The echo in a Marabar cave is . . . entirely void of distinction. Whatever is said the same monotonous noise replies and quivers up and down the walls until it is absorbed into the roof. 'Boum' is the sound, as far as the human alphabet can express it or 'ou-boum' or 'bou-oum',—utterly dull. Hope, politeness, the blowing of a nose, the squeak of a boot, all produce 'boum' . . . The more she thought over it, the more disagreeable and frightening it became. . . . If one had spoken vileness in that place, or quoted lofty poetry, the comment would have been the same 'ou-boum'. Suddenly, at the edge of her mind, Religion appeared, poor little talkative Christianity, and she knew that all its divine words from "Let there be light" to "It is finished" only amounted to 'boum'.

Man has, perhaps, fled into caves and grown out of them several times in his history. But Englishmen, living on an island, had been rather long out of theirs and they had to live with their echo for a while before they knew that caves are very much alike, whether in India, Europe or America. In the 'twenties their bits and tatters looked very little different from the bits and tatters of France or Belgium or any western European nation. God's Englishman had been killed. Boum. It was no use evolving a type who could be broken in bits from outside. England was no more an island. Whether moral, religious, philosophical or merely conventional, English writing must have a certain universal validity. The world was to be the new society.

Particularly was this important for the novelist, whose art is so much more dependent upon the shape of society than that of the poet. A novelist must have, in order to create more than a chance kaleidoscopic success, a conception of society and persons outside himself moving and thinking according to some commonly accepted pattern. Only so can realism become classical and objective. V. S. Pritchett wrote of George Eliot that "people do not appear haphazard in her books. They are not eccentrics. They are all planned and placed. She is orderly in her ethics, she is orderly in her social observation. . . . It's a sense of life which has been learned from the English village where every man and woman has his definition and place." What she taught, in effect, was "the interest of massive writing, of placing people, of showing how even the minds of characters must be placed among other minds." For the new writer this was an almost impossible path to follow unaided. How to place the minds of others when the common principles of even the English village had disintegrated? He must be a Romantic, beginning with himself and projecting his long shadow over the whole book.

Ultimately, however, he wanted to build, to construct. There were

perhaps some universal principles, not necessarily obvious in English society, which might be valid. In two camps universal claims were made and among writers moves were made towards both; the Collectivists and the Catholics earned notable recruits. It must be said that the years 1939 and 1945 seem in this connection to have no particular significance. The drift began before the 'thirties, and the second war, while creating a number of eddies, has not checked it. Nothing new appeared except a concentration of evil sufficient to crush humanistic beliefs altogether unless they took refuge in the stark autocracy of Communism, risking the falsification of the end. On the whole Catholicism, with its acceptance of the fact of suffering, gained ground.

At first, however, despite the conversion of Chesterton, the honours in the field went to the other side. English perhaps in its insistence on the spirit of community rather than on international economic dogma, grew and flourished, a group of poets under the banner of W. H. Auden. In England of the crisis, of complacent Baldwinism, of starving Jarrow and South Wales—to him, Stephen Spender and Cecil Day Lewis—there was a living lesson of the need for constructive writing as a national rather than a personal, function. In an over-populated country there could be no aesthetes living singly in ivory towers, nor even a watchman idling beside a useless fortification. They would write for the people, bringing the intelligence of internationalism to help a national need.

There were two things wrong with this: first, that all these men were *bourgeois* intellectuals, schoolmasters, whose writing was neither read by the workers (this was a matter of English tradition, as perhaps Wordsworth could have told them) nor, if it had been, would have been intelligible to them and, secondly, the shifting of the focus of poetic inspiration from the individual to the group proved disastrous to their art. They were in the wrong medium. Poetry is essentially personal. It is not mass-produced in sing-songs nor dutifully chanted on Party-days. So W. H. Auden, from being a brilliant young man who won the King's Medal for Poetry with his first book, went up F6 with Christopher Isherwood and came down the other side weak and repetitive, finally tottering into an American professorship and comparative silence. C. Day Lewis, always over-estimated, petered out. Stephen Spender, the least facile of them, found the Spanish war a dull blot on his anti-fascist dream and painfully slewed round into criticism and prose.

The dogs are barking, the crops are growing,  
But nobody knows how the wind is blowing:  
Gosh, to look at we're no great catch;  
History seems to have struck a bad patch.

Political idealism had run up against one of the laws of literature and barked its shins.

Meanwhile two young men who were to be numbered among the most refreshing and significant novelists of modern England had become



Catholics. One of them, Graham Greene, was drawn to Catholicism perhaps partly in an attempt to rationalize the fascination of violence, plain in all his books, and partly because the novelist has greater need than the poet to measure the span of his society, his world, and understand its motives. In *The Lawless Roads*, a study of the state of religion in Mexico, published in 1939, he describes the end of a cheerless day in San Luis Potosi :

I went into the Templo del Carmen, as the dark dropped, for benediction. To a stranger like myself it was like going home—a language I could understand—‘*Ora pro nobis*’. The Virgin sat on an extraordinary silver cloud like a cabbage with the Infant in her arms above the altar ; all along the walls horrifying statues with musty purple robes stood in glass coffins ; and yet it was home. One knew what was going on.

Understanding which alone would enable him to project and place other minds without making them pale shadows of his own ; a world, in fact, a workable world, whether desirable or not. How much more use to a novelist was this common spiritual core than would be a regimented uniformity of economic circumstances ! The one opened the road to the imagination of the classical realist, the other only to the inductive method of the psychiatrist. And for the other Catholic novelist, Evelyn Waugh, some such feeling must have operated too. *Brideshead Revisited*, published in 1946, made use of the social placings afforded by a constructive faith.

Most of this division happened, as I have said, before the late war. But it would be, at worst a falsehood, at best a simplification, to suggest that the majority of writers have ever been, either before 1939 or now, attached to the Catholic and Collectivist camps. The Auden school was challenged in the 'thirties, not only by an intensely individual poet like Dylan Thomas, but by a more organized group calling themselves 'apocalyptic' and advocating, albeit not in the plainest of terms, a return to a mystical religion and the old moral values. Their 'personalism' as set out by Henry Treece and J. F. Hendry in the anthology *Transformation*, was a demand for re-emphasis on the individual soul. It was perhaps English Protestantism combining with the natural artistic ego to protest against collectivism.

Obviously, however, the more intermediate and individual the position, the more likely it is to be shaken. Or perhaps one should say, the less likely it is to postulate absolutes and therefore the more likely to be changed by or adapted to circumstances. It would be well, then, at this point to consider whether the impact of the second war had any marked effect on this body of English writing.

A first reaction would be to deny any effect whatsoever. The physical experience of war need add nothing to an emotional development in which fear of it and preparation for it had occupied the whole of adult life ; only the unready need a *volte-face*. But if not the war itself, the fact of Naziism was a shock to some who had walked blindfold. Before that gigantic confluence of evil struggling beliefs in humanism and rationalism

were carried away. Nothing but a faith, a mystique (if only on the lowest level) could survive this and be stronger. Alun Lewis and Sidney Keyes, both killed, had an air of detached fatalism about them but no more. The young Christian poets, however, increase in number, untroubled by the bewilderment of 1918. Norman Nicholson, W. R. Rodgers, Ronald Duncan, Kathleen Raine and Anne Ridler are all notable examples of the recapture of confidence. The continuing power of T. S. Eliot, whose Anglo-Catholicism is perhaps a mystique of the Church rather than of the individual, but with an entirely English basis despite his reliance on the ancient world, is for these younger writers as the shadow of a great rock in a weary land.

The Collectivist tide runs rather lower. The land-marks of individual faiths are reappearing. That is true at least of poets. But the young novelist is in much worse plight. Unable to accept a spiritual core such as that offered by the Catholic Church or unaware of it, and scorning a rule-of-thumb method of creating character based on externals (as might be offered by the acceptance of an all-demanding political or economic faith), he continues the limitation under which the English novel has suffered—by way of Samuel Butler, James Joyce and Virginia Woolf—in beginning with the certain 'I'. The approach to other characters is by way of externals but, for fear the result should seem stereotyped, excesses of one sort and another are still in favour.

Nevertheless, the approach through externals produces patches of brilliant writing. In the second novel of Denton Welch, a young artist born in China, the autobiographical boy of fifteen appears by way of his linked sensations, his reactions to castle puddings, cowpats and saucers of Chinese ware. *In Youth is Pleasure* is a startling book; one has the impression that the whole atmosphere is clinical and the criteria those which the clever psychologist would use. In this and similar writing the crudescence of sex continues, because sex, resulting in identifiable physical action, can the more easily be set down in the clinical card-index. Common to almost everybody, it may be elevated to the level of a human principle.

Individualist writing of this sort would be more at home in the short story. Significantly, interest in this form has grown apace and many young writers use it deliberately to avoid dimensions they feel they cannot master or to hide the absence of large-scale placings they cannot make. One way of merging the short story into the novel is, of course, to write about children and the minds of children, whose placings are unthinking and incomplete, unchecked against those of the adult world. Denton Welch's startling boy of fifteen is unaware of fixed relationships with any of his family. Even the Bethnal Green schoolmaster whom he comes closest to liking loses him in the end: the boy confesses to him and then kicks him in the face. Overwhelmingly effective in the short story, this method in the novel becomes a game of hide-and-seek, in which the reader



gets tired first.

Deliberate limitations of this sort could be multiplied. In the absence of a settled society, whose principles are well understood and can be released at will, romantic writing must twist and turn to catch the constant ego in a new light. But constructively the emphasis must lie on the builders, those who are actively trying to influence the shape of society. Allegory is again popular; so are abstractions. These are signs of the builders. Inexperienced, they leave curiously-shaped tools about. Karl Shapiro, an American, in his *Essay on Rime*, says that history, meaning an indifferent or malignant God, has become a key-word with certain writers; history, the universal after-comment, the wisdom too late. But at least an abstraction is a recognition of the need for universality. It is an attempt to construct a philosophy of a whole life. J. B. Priestley is still providing and exploiting the emotional urge to build a new world, though his ground-plan, as in *They Came to a City*, is vague. Aldous Huxley again, fore—rather than after—armed, is looking for the universal faith. Driven out of rationalism by world evil and into pacifism by war, he postulates in his 1945 novel *Time Must Have a Stop* his new belief in The Divine Ground. "A shared theology," he says, "is one of the indispensable conditions of peace. For obvious and odious historical reasons, the Asiatic majority will not accept Christianity. Nor can it be expected that Europeans and Americans will swallow the whole of Brahmanism, say, or Buddhism. But the Minimum Working Hypothesis is also the Highest Common Factor." It is significant, too, that Somerset Maugham, who always excelled in the creation of a central materialist observer taking a detached view of the foibles and weaknesses of the remaining characters, is allowing this criticism, probably an impetus out of the last century, to be superseded by the urge to build. Now well over seventy, he shows a surprising affinity for semi-Asiatic immolation in *The Divine Ground*. His post-war novel *The Razor's Edge* picks an American as the exponent of careful walking towards this lost horizon.

Universal claims of this sort are aids at least to the general direction of a novel, if not to many of the landmarks. But to Catholics or Collectivists they savour too much of an individual peep-hole on the world, and too little of the practical. They use neither the apostolic succession nor the fundamental economic urge of man. Like all individualist standpoints, they will fail in a crisis, when the inevitable violence comes. Rex Warner, the outstanding novelist on the Collectivist side of the balance, set out in his wartime novel *The Professor* an allegory of the powerlessness of liberal humanism, with its tolerance of evil in the State, against the tide of Fascism. "I hate because I love" was the slogan the Professor failed to accept. Because of that failure he must give way to the organized force of the people, to the revolution, to the power of brotherhood based on a common belief. Possibly that was not Rex Warner's last word. His later work, *The Aerodrome*, again-an allegory, shows an uncertainty of the

final virtues of efficiency as against those of tolerance. But at least he has been impressed by the power of collectivism in time of danger. Humanism, he would say, must shed liberalism and cease to appeal only to the rational. Only by liberating the emotional in man and by stark ruthlessness to selfish opposition, can suffering be eliminated from the world.

Preaching killed H. G. Wells as a novelist and would have finished Bernard Shaw as a dramatist if his dogmas did not run both ways at once and make the audience dizzy. Participation in the struggle kills the detachment, the ability to be of the people and yet not with the people, which a novelist must have. For Aldous Huxley is right; beauty is either dangerous or irrelevant to God and to the efficient eliminators of human suffering. Aesthetics are treated harshly by both. One cannot love art and not be changed. If, then, some English novelists are using the placings afforded by Catholicism or Collectivism as an aid to writing, they are far from *terra firma*. They are not really looking for God or for a painless world, either of which would be their defeat, but for a set of human principles which they could release at will and have understood of all.

Marxists and Catholics are, in any case, dominated by crisis, by the doctrine of progress, by the contemporary world-picture. They still know where they are going. But their very movement, their preparation for the death-struggle, belittles them as writers. They have discarded the Protestant ego and the moral laws against which that ego often rebounded. The interplay of character, indeed the creation of character (which made the nineteenth century novel great) is abandoned. And many writers who own no label have slipped after them into the rôle of unofficial historians. "This strange new personage," as V. S. Pritchett writes, "has taken possession of the novel as a mist takes possession of the streets and all who breathe it are transformed and, I think, are also diminished." In brief, the novelist, on the defensive, believes in his ego only as a private sensibility commenting on history. Elbowed by a critical world situation—on perhaps by popular education and the pressure of war and crisis towards collectivism—the individual is on the way out.

Henry Reed was partly aware of this transition during the war. Ironically he wrote :

Today we have naming of parts. Yesterday  
We had daily cleaning. And tomorrow morning  
We shall have what to do after firing. But to-day,  
Today we have naming of parts. Japonica  
Glistens like coral in all of the neighbouring gardens  
And today we have naming of parts.

The firing is not yet. We are still at the naming of parts. But when the whole ideological gun is assembled, the writer, one of the last to wish away his ego, has a shrewd suspicion that he himself may be at the end of it : the wrong end.



# THE FORTNIGHTLY LIBRARY

## JOINT ADVENTURE

BY JOHN ARMITAGE

THE climax reached last month when so much social service legislation came into force on July 5, gave many opportunities for looking back over the domestic history of the last 150 years. In a review of those years many names press for acknowledgment but none more justly than that of the Webbs. *Our Partnership* is thus published at an auspicious time.\* Covering the first twenty years of the Webbs' married life it continues the story begun so brilliantly by Beatrice in her first volume of autobiography *My Apprenticeship*. Like that book, the second is composed largely of extracts from Beatrice's diary, a method so revealing of personal as well of public fortunes that it is difficult to determine which gives the reader the greater pleasure.

As far as this book is concerned it matters little that the final assessment of the Webbs' work cannot yet be made. Plain as their wish was to divert the stream of social thought, Mrs. Webb was never absolutely certain herself what that assessment would be. Her book is the flesh and blood of history not its bones. So she doubts :

Public administration is the alternative to private enterprise, and since private enterprise is corrupt and selfish we propose to supersede it by democratic control. But it is, on the face of it, as unlikely that the collectivist principle will apply all round as that the individualist principle would solve all the social problems of fifty years ago . . . But of one thing I feel certain. The controversy which seems to us now so full of significance and import will seem barren and useless to our great-grandchildren ; they will be amazed that we fought so hard to establish one metaphysical position and to destroy another.

And she makes spot judgments, some of them shrewd though cruel, like this on John Morley " . . . a pitiable person as a politician ; all the more so because he is conscientious and upright. It makes one groan to think of that moral force absolutely useless " ; others wide of the mark, though all penetrating and most, amusing. Love, too, and the desire to protect the " other one " can make it difficult for her to know her own mind :

I do not feel confident that he would be a big success in the House ; I do not think the finest part of his mind and character would be called out by the manipulation and intrigues of the lobby. And then a parliamentary career would destroy our united life ; would cut at the root of a good deal of our joint effort. Perhaps that is why I distrust my dislike of his going into Parliament ; it would take so much away from me, personally, would add so many ties and inconveniences. Sooner or later I suppose he will have to make the sacrifice—but better later than sooner.

It is curious how well this book suits the needs of the social historian. The facts he knows, or can know, by the study of documents ; and it is on these that the book is sometimes obscure. The rambling chapter entitled " The Unification of London Education " must surely fail to give a reader, ignorant of the subject, a clear picture of what took place ; but what it so triumphantly succeeds in doing is in permitting the historian to take his facts and to relive them in the atmosphere of the time. Perhaps this obscurity is symptomatic of a frustration in Beatrice's attitude towards the workings of the London County Council ; she understood it but was not of it. Sidney was cleverer, I think, than she at sharing experiences that were not his own—except religious ones—so the joint adventure was not so manifest in tasks that she did not personally share. One senses that Sidney was at times less conscious of Beatrice behind as well as beside him, than she was of him—at the hostile meetings of the Royal Commission on

\**Our Partnership*, by Beatrice Webb. Edited by Barbara Drake and Margaret I. Cole. Longmans, Green. 25s.

the Poor Law, for example. Perhaps that is merely to point a difference between man and woman in any successful marriage partnership. Sidney to Beatrice was a possession, "my boy"; Beatrice to Sidney a much beloved helpmate. But it is difficult, if intriguing, to judge. Undoubtedly their gifts were complementary and if Beatrice's mind was finer, Sidney's was ruthless.

One of the astonishing features of the Webbs' joint life was its discipline. Beginning with a private income which placed indulgence well within their grasp they not only rejected such a use of money but did so knowing well that they were missing much that made life full in the best sense. Music, art, literature and the theatre were practically closed to them; they had no time for it. Sidney—again one suspects—had no need of it. But Beatrice, whose solace in prayer the Haldanes found impossible to credit, must resolutely have closed a door which was opened only on rare visits to St. Paul's.

Looking back it seems probable that the worst fault of the Webbs was lack of appreciation of the value of the work of others. It was their approach or none. So the insurance schemes which are now the lynch pin of our social service State received scant attention:

... we are wrong, and likely to become wronger with Lloyd George and Winston Churchill over immediate issues. We do not see our way to support their insurance schemes. We shall not go against them directly, but we shall not withdraw our criticisms in the Minority Report. If their schemes can be carried out we should not much object. Both have good consequences. But we still doubt their practicability, and some of the necessary conditions strike us as very unsatisfactory. The *unconditionality* of all payments under insurance schemes constitutes a grave defect. The State gets nothing for its money in the way of conduct, it may even encourage malingerers. However, we shall honestly try not to crab the Government schemes: they are thoroughly well-intentioned.

So were the Webbs thoroughly well-intentioned: certainly their methods of investigation determined that they took things as they found them, even if led to false deductions, such as the overwhelming desirability of making the L.C.C. the education authority for the whole area. But the years of this book see them at their happiest. For almost the whole of the time they were working at self-selected tasks as investigators, using their dinner parties regardless of party politics to further their beliefs. So they had friends on both sides of the House and their home was the melting pot of ideas. In 1909 there is a change. At that date began the fight for the legislative and administrative proposals of the Minority Report of the Poor Law Commission and the plunge into propaganda. Beatrice saw the danger. She wrote: "you cannot at one and the same time exercise behind-the-scenes influence over statesmen, civil servants and newspaper editors, while you yourself engage in public propaganda of projects which these eminent ones may view with hostility or suspicion." Beatrice, wise after the event she says, sometimes regretted this turning point in the history of the Webbs. Others may regret it also.

**THE END OF AN AGE**, by W. R. Inge. Putnam. 10s. 6d.

There are writers, Dr. Inge is one, who have not thought fit to reduce their principles to one co-ordinated system, but rather have declared their opinions in a series of essays, from which the reader is left, if he be of the mind to do so, to extract a coherent doctrine. The former Dean of St. Paul's reveals in his latest book a breadth of religious and philosophic mind coupled with those personal and characteristic idiosyncrasies for which he has prepared us in his

earlier articles and volumes, so that, at the end, we are in some bewilderment how to connect his profound generalities with his local and vehement prejudices in favour of euthanasia and on control of birth. The Doctor, however, with all his dislikes and affections, is a profound thinker and prophet and his opinions deserve the most serious consideration.

Basically, of course, Dr. Inge is a Platonist and an admirer of the neo-Platonic school, of Plotinus in particular; his translation of whose works and commentary thereon is of lasting value. Now, in his new book *The End of an*



Age, he writes : " Ultimate values are the most real things in the world—it is in our power to live resolutely in the Good, The Whole and the Beautiful." This, he declares, following Plotinus, is the last word in philosophy. Nevertheless he justifies a relative pessimism : " The brighter the sunshine, the darker are the shadows. To ascend beyond good and evil is not for man in this life." Shallow optimism is to be reprobated. And again : " The world of space and time is sacramental. It is linked to eternal reality through love, for in love the divine is incarnated to win deliverance though suffering ; life though death."

So far the Doctor reveals himself as a Christian Platonist. The proof of God through the observation of nature, a method employed by St. Thomas, following Aristotle, and commended by the Catholic church is not utilized. " The Universal is the only reality " and our world at best but a reflection of it—so far Dr. Inge rejects the Aristotelian denial of universals and places himself with St. Clement of Alexandria, St. Augustine and St. Bonaventura in his acceptance of Eternal Norms. Yet, despite his repudiation of Catholic philosophy as now officially accepted and taught, and the Catholic Church as the sole divine institution on earth, he is no uncritical Protestant ; he condemns Luther for his separation of faith and works, and sees in the " reformer's " acceptance of final sovereign secular power the beginnings of the modern glorification of the State, a tendency which the author abhors. He concedes that medieval papalism, in insisting on the supremacy of the spiritual over the secular, as exemplified by Hildebrand (he might have added Innocent III), upheld a more Christian principle.

National qualities are not to him absolute ; he points out how once the Scandinavians were the terror of Europe and the invading Tartars quiet agriculturists. Rather does he favour the views of Christopher Dawson in his *Progress and Religion* (a book which

Dr. Inge once commended to me and to many others as of permanent value in cultural science and history). " The Curse of War " is a moving essay and the author again denounces the medieval Church for its toleration of chivalry and the religious orders of knighthood ; he declares that it was the heretics, the Catheri and the Albigenses who protested against fighting, though the later Protestants, Luther and Zwingli, with their Erastian leanings, did and could not. Hegel, Moltke and Treitschke are their successors. It is significant that the limitation of battle to " just " war in the Catholic Church has no such qualification in the thirty-nine articles.

Yet in the chapter headed the " Sickness of Christendom ", Dr. Inge gives us little that is constructive. The notion of an over-riding ecclesiastical authority, binding upon the consciences of Christians, he repudiates : " There will be an end of the insolent arrogance of exclusive ecclesiasticism " he writes. " There will even be friendly intercourse with the religions of Asia." Nor is the Bible in his view any more infallible than the Church. An inner light alone will carry us forward, a reliance, that is, upon personal experience and practice in love coupled with the metaphysic of the eternity of God. Here he quotes with approval St. Thomas of Aquin : " There is no possibility of real Being to pass out of existence."

To some it may seem that Dr. Inge has confused the admitted failure of the Catholic Church with its divine mission, but that is to enter into polemics unsuited for a review of this work.

Politically, Dr. Inge is a Victorian individualist and deploras the encroachments of authority, secular as well as religious, but when it comes to questions of eugenics, which of all matters would appear to most people to be radically personal, he appears as a full blooded Platonist, willing to accept much control in the interest of " good births " ; such an attitude is difficult of reconciliation with his general liberalism.

HENRY SLESSER.

**THE FEDERALIST—OR THE NEW CONSTITUTION,** by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay. Edited with an Introduction and Notes by Max Beloff. *Basil Blackwell, Oxford.* 9s. 6d.

This scholarly production by the new Reader in the Comparative Study of Institutions in the University of Oxford is most useful for two quite different reasons. It throws a searchlight on the background of the political institutions of the United States, and never was it more necessary for us in England to understand the American Constitution. But it also underlines the complete fatuity of seeking in the political processes of the transatlantic giant any useful analogy with the conditions of a possible supra-national government in Europe. In his Introduction Mr. Beloff first of all makes the point that, while it certainly deserves a place among the great texts of political science, this series of essays by "Publius" published in serial form in the New York press between October 1787 and August 1788, is not to be regarded as a fount of economic wisdom; for, whatever its intrinsic merit in that respect at the time, "it is the economic interpretation of the politics of a pre-industrial society." He then examines the circumstances surrounding its composition, supplies an analytical guide to the text, showing the underlying structure of general political ideas, and essays an evaluation of its place in the history of political theory. The essential content of this tract for the times, which for all its great merits reveals the characteristic American "unawareness of history as a continuing process," is indicated at the end of Publius' first essay (by Alexander Hamilton):

The utility of the Union to your political prosperity . . . The insufficiency of the present confederation to preserve that Union. . . . The necessity of a government, at least equally energetic with the one proposed to the attainment of this object. . . . The conformity of the proposed constitution to the true principles of republican government. . . . Its analogy to your own State constitution. . . . and lastly, the additional security which

its adoption will afford to the preservation of that species of government, to liberty and to property.

The last sentence is significant of the interests upholding the Constitution; merchants and planters against a motley collection of urban radicals and insurgent farmers.

WILLIAM RYDAL.

**THE ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY,** by W. Friedmann. *Stevens.* 25s.

Whether we are concerned with the future of the Ruhr or with the general problems of Germany's development, the key to the problem is always the same: no solution is possible until and unless the capacities and needs of Germany are treated as part of a wider international plan.

The international situation to-day changes so quickly that a book of this kind, written as a contribution to politics, becomes in the space of a few months a work of history. In 1948 the Allied differences that in 1947 seemed to Professor Friedmann, as to many others "not yet unbridgeable", have become so much more clearly defined that the separation of Germany into east and west is generally accepted as an inevitable feature of the present political landscape. Professor Friedmann's "wider international plan" is indeed taking shape, but it is a plan that is as sharp in what it excludes as it is wide in what it embraces. Thus while it is still true that as between Great Britain, the U.S.A. and France, and particularly as between France and the other two western powers, there may be "conflicting policies insufficiently adjusted to one another," as between the three western powers on the one hand and Russia on the other, it is no longer a question so much of a failure to adjust conflicting policies as of a conflict in policy that is openly and plainly insusceptible to adjustment. Hence, inevitably, arises a certain appearance of unreality in much of the book.

None the less, this is probably the calmest and the most comprehensive account of the German problem that has appeared since the war. The historian will probably consider the Allied



occupation of Germany as essays in international co-operation, in national reconstruction, and in international leadership; from the points of view, first, of the extent to which the Allies succeeded in subjecting their individual aims and methods in achieving what at one time, at any rate, appeared a common purpose; secondly, of their success in bringing physical order out of chaos, and, thirdly, of their success in persuading the Germans to follow their own examples in the fields of government and social life and so of abandoning the ways that reduced them, in 1945, to the status of international outcasts. In each of these respects Professor Friedmann makes a critical and well-balanced contribution.

There is little that needs to be said here of the co-operation, or lack of it, between the Allies, of the differences of purpose that are dividing the west from the east and are checking, and to some extent reducing the efficacy of, the work that the three western powers are doing to achieve a united western Germany. Of the work of reconstruction, Professor Friedmann has much to say that is just and illuminating, of the conflict between the desire to prevent Germany from being a menace through her misery, so urgent in 1945, and the desire to prevent her from being a menace through her strength, so potent a factor during the war years whilst the military government of Germany was being planned. He is outspokenly critical of the extent to which the latter trend has influenced post-war policy, notably in the dismantling of German industry, but he does not seem quite to appreciate that it may be difficult to guide Germany into the paths of peace whilst any substantial part of her war industry remains intact. He is equally critical of our policy towards trade unions and trade associations, and he asserts roundly that in treating the former as existing solely for the purpose of collective bargaining the British have missed their great opportunity. On the other hand, he criticizes our introduction of local government on the English model as

going too far in the direction of imposing on the Germans ideas and institutions that are alien to them.

These two problems, of trade unions and local government, raise in an acute form the question of the nature of the leadership it is wise and practicable for their conquerors to give the Germans. Should they teach or should they hold the ring while the Germans learn for themselves? This is the crucial question of the occupation, and the value of Professor Friedmann's book is limited by the extent to which he fails to make clear what his own answer would be.

W. T. WELLS.

**FROM CHARLEMAGNE TO HITLER.** A short political history of Germany, by J. S. Davies. *Cassell*. 12s. 6d.

**THE COMING OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION,** by Georges Lefebvre. Translated by R. R. Palmer. *Princeton University Press*: *Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press*. 16s.

In his early chapters, Mr. Davies makes some useful contrasts between situations in England, France and Germany. He shows that "in other circumstances" various beginnings of nationhood in Germany might well have grown into something comparable with those institutions which have survived across the centuries in England and France as recognizable elements of the national fabric. In Germany, however, they remained inchoate and fragmentary, and history there was long to be a record of confusion and disintegration prevailing over attempts towards unity.

He gives a good account of these conflicts, but does not always establish the broader background. He tells us little of the religious significance of the Reformation, and its effects upon the minds of men; and he says little about Luther's personality. Similarly, a closer study of Frederick the Great is needed if we are to see why he became a pattern to be followed by other leaders of Prussia and Germany.

The estimate of the achievements of Metternich and Bismarck, and of the methods they used to enforce their policies, is concise. There is no reference however, to Bismarck's proclamation in 1862 of the policy of "blood and iron". Mr. Davies considers that Bismarck's *Reichstag* has been unduly criticized; he surmises that French reactions might have been almost as sharp if Bismarck had not edited the Ems telegram before releasing the communiqué that precipitated the Franco-Prussian War.

In the much disputed question of the extent to which the Allies assented to the Fourteen Points put forward by President Wilson as a basis for peace negotiations, the author simplifies the situation unduly by stating that the Allies "agreed to the proposal", subject to a German undertaking to pay compensation for all damage. He thus omits the specific qualification about the freedom of the seas, and he does not make it clear that what the Allies really accepted, with some reservations, was the interpretation given to the President's proposals by Colonel House, although this commentary was not communicated to the Germans.

Mr. Davies is successful in describing the forces which brought Hitler and the Nazis to power, and their manoeuvres and stratagems. He would have made his narrative more complete if he had explained the importance of all those theories of the State, and of German national objectives, which had been adumbrated by German historians and political philosophers from the nineteenth century onwards. In a political history of Germany, it is surprising to find no reference to Clausewitz, with his axiom that "war is a continuation of policy by other means," nor to such latter-day 'prophets' as Houston Chamberlain and Rosenberg. To omit a full discussion of these ideas, so often disregarded by the outside world as metaphysical and incomprehensible absurdities, is to overlook one of the main dynamics of German action.

M. Georges Lefebvre's volume was intended for a wider public, and written

in 1939 to commemorate the 150th anniversary of the Revolution. The Vichy Government subsequently tried to suppress the book entirely, and ordered eight thousand copies to be destroyed. It is difficult to do justice to its high quality, with its substantial content, its quiet authority, and its clarity of exposition. M. Lefebvre shows an equity of judgment not always possessed by the specialist in a field that has provoked endless and bitter controversy. He provides an admirably reasoned discussion of the complex circumstances—political, social and economic—which culminated in the Revolution, and made it a nation-wide movement.

Unlike some historians, M. Lefebvre does not attempt to impose retrospectively a fierce consistency of purpose upon the events that marked its course. He explains how much was due to accident or the pressure of the moment, how much was provoked by sudden emotions or long-standing grievances, in that year of 1789 when the French were fighting, not for personal advantage alone, but for their faith in the essential rights of man.

This is the first work of M. Lefebvre to be translated into English, and Mr. R. R. Palmer has served him well: he not merely provides an excellent translation, but he adds an admirable preface and some illuminating notes.

CHARLES GOULD.

### THE TRADE OF NATIONS, by Michael A. Heilperin. *Longmans*. 19s. 6d.

Mr. Heilperin's book was first published in America in 1946. Today the work is mainly of historical interest, namely in so far as it shows what general ideas, theories, preconceptions and, alas, prejudices inspired in the first post-war period an American economist—or one, at least, who identifies himself with the American viewpoint. As such, the author possesses an unusually good knowledge of European problems. He is therefore in



a position to take a more detached view of U.S. foreign economic policy than most of his American *confrères*.

In 1948, the only chapter of *The Trade of Nations* that has not been overtaken by events is the last, entitled "The United States and the World Economy". In this, the author pleads the overwhelmingly strong case for a "nearly free-trade" economy in the U.S.A. (p. 232); he also calls for the institution of a Commission on the Tariff which would have the task of securing a major reduction of the U.S. tariff. Mr. Heilperin argues that "the working out of a new and *low* (the italics are in the text) American tariff is a 'must' on our national agenda for the future" (p. 232). Thus, he is one of the still not numerous American economists who are prepared to take themselves the medicine which they so liberally prescribe to others. Indeed, he goes so far as to say that "if we (the U.S.A.) are to be repaid (for credits granted), we must accept eventually a *net* inflow of foreign goods and services" (p. 233). This is another way of saying that the U.S. must, in its balance of payments, develop an import surplus on current account, instead of persistently maintaining an export surplus. In Europe at least this thesis has long ceased to be new.

Nor is it surprising to find the author defending the merits of a free-enterprise economy: free markets, the price mechanism, the advantages of a freely operating international division of labour, all these are extolled; national (*versus* international) full employment policies, buffer stocks, commodity agreements, cartels are correspondingly condemned. The logic of the argument is unexceptionable even if it is far from new. Professors Rappard and Röpke of the Institut des Hautes Etudes Internationales, Geneva, among whose pupils Mr. Heilperin at one time counted, or Professors von Mises and von Hayek have, each in his field, defended similar views and will no doubt continue to do so. Nor is it doubtful that in a rational world peopled exclusively by *homines*

*oeconomici* of different tongues, but of one mind—a mind dominated by the search for the greatest economic advantage—the realization of the optimum division of international labour would indeed be *the* perfect solution. Unfortunately this world is not rational. And no condemnation of economic (and political) nationalism is of any avail, any more than is the invocation of a happy "nearly free-trade" past.

There is, incidentally, no doubt that national full employment policies taken singly—against which Mr. Heilperin pleads—are insufficient to remove the danger of economic crises, that indeed the solution must be sought in an *international* full employment policy. But first, such a policy hinges on the U.S. taking the medicine prescribed to it by, among others, Mr. Heilperin; and, secondly, such a policy is impossible without a considerable degree of planning—against which the author sets forth the usual unconvincing arguments current among American economists.

Having developed the free-enterpriser's usual arguments, Mr. Heilperin is compelled to write:

In a world subject to more or less violent fluctuations of economic activity, international trade alone cannot assure continued employment and prosperity. It is necessary to achieve a considerable degree of co-ordination among the national business-cycle policies and to supplement them by appropriate international measures. And, as part of the program, all national policies that interfere with the international division of labour must be ruled out outright, or be subjected to the supervision of (sic) an international body (p. 132).

What is the difference between such a policy and *international planning*? And how can such a policy be applied without a large measure of *domestic planning*?

R. P. SCHWARZ.

**CHINA CHANGED MY MIND**, by David Morris. Cassell. 8s. 6d.

**GUEST OF AN EMPEROR**, by Martin Weedon. Arthur Barker. 10s. 6d.

There are two distinct sides to Mr. Morris's book. One is the vivid descrip-

tion, not so much of the war in China where for two and a half years he drove a lorry in the Friends' Ambulance Unit, as of what happened behind it; the other, his intense interest in his own emotions as a pacifist at school and college and a 'conchy' in the war, until China changed him and he came home to join the Army. Obviously Mr. Morris was no coward. He played rugger for Oxford and proved his courage to himself through much fearful night-work in the London blitz. And a mere egotist would scarcely have gone to China. His book is thus important as a revelation of what is probably going on in the minds of most of the younger generation, and which may yet, one prays, save the world. Meanwhile it is pleasing to note that no one ever threw Mr. Morris's 'conchydom' in his teeth; rather they seemed to admire his courage in standing up for his principles.

Of the shocking mismanagement of the war in China after the first year's heroic resistance and when the Government had retreated to Chungking, Mr. Morris has nothing very novel to say, but the intense interest and pathos of his book are none the less absorbing. Dirt and disease; "the general misery of millions of half-starved soldiers always diseased and sometimes wounded" for whom the Chinese doctors and nurses strove bravely but ineffectually; the gangs of wretched coolies roped together and herded off to the front: such were the daily surroundings of Mr. Morris. Kuomintang spies were everywhere and those who incautiously showed distaste for the pure milk of Kuomintangism quickly vanished away. Thus were the seeds of China's present misfortunes sown. There is no essential difference between Kuomintang and communists. Both alike, sanctimoniously mouthing "the teachings of Dr. Sun Yat-sen," labour to enforce a totalitarianism as hard (and as alien to China) as that of the Legalists 2,000 years ago. Ultimately China's real good feeling and common sense, to which Mr. Morris pays full tribute, will prevail. But one fears that

she has hard years still to go through, not impossibly complete disruption as after the downfall of the Hans.

The Japanese Army's brutal treatment of prisoners is now a commonplace, but the reality of it is doubly brought home to one by the daily diary which Captain Weedon contrived to keep during his three and a half years as a prisoner in Japan and which is now published exactly as written. The toughness of the human frame was frequently shown during the bombing of London when great buildings were riven in pieces while the men in them survived. But it seems almost incredible that any of the prisoners survived (in fact many did not) the starvation diet, the daily slappings and torturings, the hateful neglect in hospital when even Japanese officers had to realize that they were too ill to work. And yet the prisoners never lost their spirit. Somehow they put up theatrical entertainments at Christmas, smuggled food into the camp (for the Japanese were unblushingly corruptible), and their unquenched sense of fun is shown by the story of the officer who, when ordered to send home a eulogy of Japan's military strength, wrote: "The offensiveness of the Nips must be seen to be believed." It got past the censor.

Captain Weedon notes that civilians for whom the prisoners had to work often showed sympathy for them and gave them little presents. This is to be remembered, with much else that might be told of Japanese loyalty to friends even though with risk to themselves. Japanese character is emphatically not summed up by the misconduct of Japanese officers in the late war.

O. M. GREEN.

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**RICHER BY ASIA**, by Edmond Taylor. *Secker and Warburg*. 16s.  
**NEW PATHS FOR JAPAN**, by Harold Wakefield. *Royal Institute of International Affairs*. 15s.

Despite its verbosity (it runs to more than four hundred closely-printed pages),



its repetitions and the clumsy style of much of the writing, *Richer by Asia* merits the attention of all those who believe that only with the formation of some kind of world government can we hope for lasting peace. Mr. Taylor, who was an officer in the United States Navy and served during the war with secret intelligence organizations in India and various countries of South East Asia, feels that although many political solutions to this problem have been proposed the psychological and cultural aspects of it have been largely ignored, and it is these with which he is here mainly concerned. Most of us, he says, when we think of the possibilities of forming a world State, think of it as a world organized largely for the benefit of Americans and British, and that if we continue to think along these lines there is not even a remote possibility of success. In his opinion, this can only come when we take into consideration the social customs, the culture, the hopes and aspirations of the so-called "backward" peoples who, it so happens, form the majority of the world's population. Mr. Taylor suggests that the peoples of India and the Far East should adopt the rôle of a "cultural opposition" to the western way of life since only in this way can the necessary compromise between east and west be brought about.

The greater part of the book deals with India, and scattered among its pages are some excellent pieces of descriptive reporting. But when it comes to philosophy (and there is a great deal of it in this book) Mr. Taylor's writing is not on the same high level, largely, one feels, because he is not sufficiently disciplined in philosophic method, and has had therefore to grope his way. It was probably for him the only possible method, but the result does not make for easy reading.

*New Paths for Japan* is a revised, amended and expanded version of *Japan in Defeat*, a report prepared by a Chatham House Study Group and published originally in 1945. The first half of the book consists of factual material con-

cerning the evolution of modern Japan, and, while it does not add anything to what is already available in numerous other treatises, is at least a useful condensation which omits none of the relevant facts. Part 2 deals with events since the end of the war up to the middle of 1947 and is a summary of political, economic and social happenings during the period. It has been compiled, for the most part, from the monthly reports issued by General MacArthur's headquarters and information obtained from various American newspapers.

Mr. Wakefield's book was written at a time when a peace treaty with Japan seemed to be imminent. Conditions have, however, since changed so much that some of his recommendations are now, unfortunately, of only academic interest. He refers, for instance, to the desirability of other nations following the American example of establishing

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libraries in Tokyo and other cities. All those who know the keenness of Japanese desire for the acquisition of western knowledge will agree with him; the difficulty is that the American authorities have hitherto refused to allow this, presumably because it would create a precedent for the establishment of a Russian library.

On the subject of education his views are sound and practical. He feels, however, that it was a mistake to forbid the schools to retain their portrait of the Emperor. Its removal, he says, "will cause great resentment, which will be quickened every time the Japanese look at the empty alcove"; but when I returned to Japan in 1946 I did not find this to be at all the case, probably because the Emperor had already begun to be seen in public and there was no longer any mystery about him.

JOHN MORRIS.

**THE BRITISH EMPIRE**, edited by Hector Bolitho. *Batsford*. 21s.  
**A PRINCE OF ARABIA**, by George Stitt. *Allen and Unwin*. 21s.

The various writers in this interesting volume dealing with the British Empire have been well chosen and the illustrations, as always with a Batsford book, extremely so. Among the most fascinating are those which depict scenes in bygone days, such as "Main Street, Port Elizabeth" in 1864 and one showing cottages in Princes Street, Sydney, at about the same period. Very beautiful is the river scene in the Solomon Islands, this part of the world being described by Sir Harry Luke, who is a never-failing guide to what is attractive in matters of human and other spheres. Here he is handicapped by reason of space, but he manages to give us a quart full of good things in a pint pot. On Malta, where he served for years as Lieutenant Governor, he is excellent; he gives full marks to the gallant, cultivated French dynasty of Lusignan which reigned in Cyprus for several centuries and it will interest him to hear that the last descendant of that

famous family, a doctor, is now working at a British hospital in the Greek island of Rhodes.

One naturally looks in such a book for information on the more out-of-the-way parts of the Empire and I was sorry that I could find nothing about the Seychelles, although they figure in the index. And there is a pleasant illustration of Mahé, the capital, where I believe it is always afternoon. General Gordon held that the Seychelles is the site of the Garden of Eden. It would have been agreeable to have this confirmed or denied. There are only a very few words concerning British Honduras, which is so much desired by Guatemala. This question might with advantage have been explained, with the reason for our neglect to build a road giving Guatemala access, as was arranged, to the Atlantic from her northern provinces, so that she would not have to rely upon air traffic at such expense that her propaganda against us flourishes. No doubt there is good cause why this road has not yet been constructed. But it is not the aim of the writers to touch more than they can help on controversial matters. Rather do they endeavour, and quite successfully, to lay before us what has been achieved.

In the section devoted to Ceylon some allusion might have been made to Mr. Freeman, who for so long was the sole Briton to be elected to the Legislative Council, his popularity being such that his native opponents invariably lost their deposits, and of course the electors were overwhelmingly natives. It was their custom whenever they met Freeman to jump down from their ox-waggons and prostrate themselves in the dust, much to Freeman's distaste. One may hope that with Ceylon embarked on a new era there will be Britons half as popular as he was to take part in the administration.

In the turmoil which has engulfed the Arab world a very faint figure is that of the Emir Shereef Ali Haider, whose ancestors, direct descendants of the Prophet, held the Emirate of Mecca for 700 years. However the grandfather of the gentleman celebrated in *A Prince*



of *Arabia* was deposed in favour of a rival family in the middle of the last century and not until 1916 did the Turks recognize Ali Haider, who proceeded to Medina in a vain effort to establish Arab unity. One gains the impression that he was a most amiable, but somewhat weak personage, unequal to the task that faced him, which might indeed have been even too much for such a man as Kemal Atatürk.

We have had a previous book, *Arabesque*, by the Princess Musbah Haider, in which the Emir's English marriage is recounted with adequate details and it may be doubted whether the part he played in politics warrants another volume devoted to his activities and the lack of them. With British officers the Shereef's relationship was always most cordial and there is a story, here described, of a certain junior naval officer whose enthusiasm for the cause of the Shereef carried him to the verge of indiscretion. As Mr. Stitt remarks, it is a tribute to the sense of humour of those in high places that the Admiralty replied to him that "they would like to point out that there are many opportunities in H.M. Service for the exercise of originality without taking amateur excursions into the realm of International Politics."

HENRY BAERLEIN.

**RETURN JOURNEY**, by A. S. B.

Arkwright. *Seeley Service*. 12s. 6d.

**SONS OF THE EAGLE**, by Julian

Amery. *Macmillan*. 21s.

No publisher is likely to accept a 'war-book' to-day unless he has strong reason to believe that it will be a success. A high standard has therefore been set, which these two books honourably maintain. Both Major Arkwright and Mr. Julian Amery show themselves as competent at writing fluent prose as ever they were at soldiering and they have succeeded in recapturing the spirit of the events through which they lived. Each has an eye for detail, a respect for the facts and commendable modesty.

*Return Journey* is the tale of an escape

from a prisoner-of-war camp in Germany in 1942. The plan is laid with care and executed with daring; these early pages are the best of the book. Less satisfying is its portrayal of those faithful friends in the underground movement in Holland, Belgium and France who risked their lives to speed escaping prisoners along the road to freedom. It is a pity that these deserving people never fully come to life; but since the author spent so few days with each of his helpers, it is perhaps excusable. This is a simple, unpretentious book; Major Arkwright makes no claim to have rivalled the exploits of A. J. Evans in the 1914-1918 war.

Nor does Mr. Julian Amery imagine himself as a second T. E. Lawrence. In *Sons of the Eagle* he tells the story of a brave mission which failed. He was one of a small party of British officers who were dropped from the skies to join the rebel factions in northern Albania and who remained long enough to see them overrun by the communist rebels from the south. The scene is laid in a distant mountainous area, whose influence on the great events of the war was negligible. But here on this small stage is enacted a sketch which contains in simplified form the essential components of the drama of Europe as a whole. Thus, while the story is told of Abas Kupa and the other chieftains who supported the exiled King Zog discussing amongst themselves the right moment to attack the German occupation troops, or the best method of obtaining British arms, or the dangers inherent in British aid to the communists of the south, fresh light is thrown on the problems which faced the resistance movements of all occupied Europe.

For the British reader there is another point of historical interest. Was it right to send arms to the communist rebels, on the ground that they were engaged openly against the Germans, while withholding them from the non-communists, who, being more vulnerable to reprisals, were compelled to be more cautious? It was the non-communists

who would to-day have been the friends of Britain, had they survived the internal conflict which followed the retreat of the Germans. Here is a portrait in miniature of what C. M. Woodhouse in his recent book on contemporary Greece calls "the unresolved conflict of policy between short-term strategy and long-term diplomacy."

The non-communists could muster in all some twenty thousand rifles. But they could never be a mobile force; they could never afford to leave their farms and villages unprotected. This led Mr. Amery to think in terms of a "general revolt", as a more practicable alternative to recognized guerrilla tactics.

If the Germans had been the only enemies, such tactics would no doubt have succeeded. But before the experiment could be made the communists began their hostile movement northward. In vain did the British party appeal to their headquarters in Cairo to intervene in time to prevent a civil war. For political as well as military reasons, the decision had been taken at a high level that the spread of Communism in the Balkans should not be opposed except in Greece. The British officers in the north then had the humiliating experience of watching their friends defeated by a rival faction using British arms. It was indeed greatly to the credit of the disappointed Albanians that Mr. Amery and his friends were allowed to depart in peace.

Similar hardships and humiliations were borne by most of the brave band of British officers who carried out hazardous operations in enemy-held territory. The name of England is respected in Europe wherever such men worked and fought. Mr. Amery is a worthy spokesman of them all.

NIGEL BRUCE.

**SHALL I EMIGRATE?**, by Roy Lewis, with the assistance of Arthur Frazer. *Phoenix House*. 15s.

During the last two years, despite a most austere lack of transport, British migrants to the Dominions numbered

150,000, and that was but a fraction of the number of applicants for passages registered at the London offices of the Dominion Governments. Shipping, however, is rapidly increasing; before the end of the year 23,000 berths will be available on the Australian route, and a similar expansion on the Canadian route is being supplemented by a service of air-borne emigration. There have been times when migration on the scale now developing would have been unwelcome in the Dominions. The position is now very different; there is a keen demand for workers from this country.

But not for any kind of worker. A century ago, would-be migrants to the Dominions were advised to take Robinson Crusoe as the type of man most likely to succeed in a new country—a general handyman. Now, though there are still places for such men, the chief need is for workers with special skill in secondary or tertiary occupations. The war has much stimulated the industrialization of the Dominions. Skilled men are needed in the new factories, and, most urgently, in all branches of the building trade, for the lack of houses in the Dominions is more stringent even than in Britain. There are many openings in other occupations, but it is important that those who contemplate emigrating should first ascertain whether the services they are qualified to render are in demand where they wish to go.

Such persons cannot do better than study this valuable and very readable book. The authors have taken great pains to collect the latest particulars of the conditions in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, and in Southern Rhodesia and Kenya, that are of chief importance to newcomers from Britain, and they present the information in a book which, lucid and well written, grips the reader's attention from beginning to end. For each country described we are told, with surprisingly complete detail, what kinds of workers are needed, what incomes they may expect to earn, what it will cost them to live, in what



respects life in the Dominions differs from life in this country, and what are the prospects of advancement for those with or without capital. Full information is also given of the various agencies established for the assistance of migrants. The authors advise those who have to wait a considerable time for a passage to subscribe to a daily or weekly Dominion newspaper, and read each number through carefully "even to the advertisements".

The book is, however, much more than a most helpful guide for persons considering whether to emigrate. It is also a well informed and thoughtful contribution to one of the most important of contemporary problems: how may the population of the British Commonwealth be distributed to promote the best interests of the individual countries and of the Commonwealth as a whole?

G. F. McCLEARY.

### THE COLLECTED POEMS OF RICHARD CHURCH. *Dent. 15s.*

Although from these first *Collected Poems*, *Twentieth Century Psalter* and *The Lamp* are excluded, this book contains a major part of Mr. Church's life's work in poetry and is therefore difficult to review both briefly and adequately. But it must, I think, be conceded that Mr. Church is among the best poets of his generation still writing, a rival of Robert Graves, Edmund Blunden, V. Sackville-West, T. S. Eliot and Edith Sitwell. My general impression of his work is that it represents a dual triumph, over words and spirit; or rather that the author's slow, patient, gradual victory over words has enabled him to reveal, in a lovely late-flowering beauty, the affirmations of a soothing, modest and noble spirit. Here everywhere are evidences of much-to-be-prized qualities, grace of mind, love of nature, and above all deep compassion for the agonies of our time expressed through the singleness of a warm heart. He writes of another as he could have written of himself:

I shall come again and find  
Your old simplicity of heart

And the deep wisdom of your mind . . .

He is a quiet poet—perhaps a poets' poet in his care for his craft, as also in the careful attention his work demands—and if his work lacks something it is the final exuberance, the brilliant line that has surprised the mind, the "fine excess", the unforgettable phrase.

What is impressive is the integrity of his vision of the modern scene working cumulatively, together with his sympathy for "the whole creation that groaneth and travaileth in pain together." The earlier poems, some of them imagist and excellent, are more objectively conceived and have not the heart-warmth of the later ones. His appreciation of nature, often conversational as Edward Thomas, sometimes direct as Davies, at times subtly thoughtful as Andrew Young, is nearly always in the shorter poems admirably compact; though in the longer poems there is a tendency to meander. Quotation must be invidious from such a volume; yet what a successful salute to Faithy is this:

#### A PROCESSION

Marvellous things filled the morning:  
The bourdon bee from grass  
To grass heaved his brown sacks;  
The butterfly battled with air,  
Adorning her wings with light.  
Beetles with armoured backs  
Flashed steel and bronze so bright  
That a king, it seemed, must pass  
For the hordes of the orchard to stare,  
Raise huzzah and buzz  
With rustic gossamer wing,  
Their acclamation thus  
Catching sunshine, noon-sound,  
Hay-height above the ground,  
Though none quite glimpsed the king.

"A man without faith grows old before his years," writes Mr. Church, and it would seem that through nature his faith in beauty and goodness, the old verities, is now absolute. And here to conclude in "These Words" is his poet's faith:

But all of them, long-lived or quickly gone,  
Are active powers, the radium of thought,  
The close-packed atoms of our human story.  
Here then is need for caution. Be admonished  
To use these daily words as though God-  
wrought,

Magical master-keys to light and glory.

JOSEPH BRADDOCK.



## BOOKS ON THE TABLE

Out of the millions who start a diary only one or two keep on. This truism smote its perpetrator like an apocalypse after finishing *THE SEVEN THUNDERS* (Faber & Faber. 21s.), the sixth and last volume of Sarah Gertrude Millin's record of the war. The industry which has produced a book for each of those years seems matter enough for praise and if the author ever groaned beneath the burden it is inaudible as she moves on to the climax of Nuremberg. Furthermore, first hailed on this page in June 1947, the objectiveness still distinguishes Mrs. Millin's work and her comment is sparse and shrewd as ever. All these factors, from perseverance to pertinence, make the ideal diary of world events; surely too they make the ideal history.—*THE YEAR BOOK OF WORLD AFFAIRS* 1948 (Stevens & Sons. 20s.) provides the student of this dire decade with a series of essays from various authorities which, skittishly speaking of so sober a volume, could be grouped under a sub-heading: "How to clear up the mess". Among others, there are E. Ker's "Moral Standards in International Relations", "The Future of British Foreign Policy" by G. W. Keeton, Sir Frederick Whyte's "Japan", "The Security Council in Action" by L. C. Green and G. E. Stent's "Colour Problems of South Africa", all pointers for present and future behaviour. The London Institute of World Affairs does well to publish these annual findings in sociological, economic and legal questions for the guidance of those who find the daily newspaper insufficient or superficial.

**Born out of their time**

Why should I strive to set the crooked straight? sang William Morris—and never stopped trying. He is one of Holbrook Jackson's *DREAMERS OF DREAMS* (Faber & Faber. 16s.), the others being Carlyle, Ruskin, Emerson, Thoreau and Whitman, each in his way as much a striver. Unhappily, death has ended Mr. Jackson's

studies on "The Rise and Fall of 19th Century Idealism" whereby his reader is made stingingly aware of the intellectual vigour of the dreamers. Carlyle, the scolding moralist with his belief in a superman; Ruskin, who had faith in good living by lesser men; Morris, practising what Ruskin preached; their American kinsmen helping to mould their own brand of democracy—all of them bound by fundamental sympathy, being influenced by their times and in turn influencing each other. This is a book that one would like to have written.

**All God's chillun**

One of the by-products of the American brand of democracy is picked out mercilessly by the searchlight of *TWELVE MILLION BLACK VOICES* (Lindsay Drummond. 15s.). The author, Richard Wright, with the many graphic photographs secured and arranged by Edwin Rosskam and not made especially for this beautifully produced book, tells the folk history of the ordinary Negro in the United States and a sordid tale it is of exploitation—by bosses, kitchenettes, black belts, cotton picking machinery, shacks, disease and hopelessness. The illustrations have been dexterously fitted to the text, which has been pruned of all redundancy. A reasonable wish, one would think, "to share in the upward march of American life, the only life we remember or have ever known." This should be the next President's bedside book—guaranteed to give him insomnia, a complaint from which all good presidents ought to suffer.

**Irish Heritage**

When, however, Richard Wright compares the Negroes with the Irish he confuses oppressors; Eire's tyrant, plainly to be seen on a recent visit, is *not* England. *THE IRISH* by Sean O'Faolain (Pelican Books. 1s. 6d.) is recommended as indispensable to the



intending visitor, whether to the wilds of Kerry or the sophistications around Wicklow. Coming from a native who actually lives in his country, this book is valued for the detachment, the fairness of its judgments, and for the restraint it imposes on the prejudices of the English holiday maker who certainly gets no hint that she is one of the "hated".—And walking tirelessly about the Dublin streets to look for those radiant landmarks of the imagination that spring from literary associations, she, also, is oblivious of political stains. Leaving Westland Row is not just emerging from the typical dreary railway station; it is being near the birthplace of one of Ireland's most brilliant sons. *THE TRIALS OF OSCAR WILDE*, edited with an Introduction by H. Montgomery Hyde (*William Hodge*. 15s.) is likely to be the best book, ever, about that spendthrift genius. The twentieth century has had his qualities of art and of living—his wit, his inversions either verbal or pathological, his unfailing kindheartedness, his gifts of scholarship—whipped up by various interpretations into a legendary concoction that titillates or nauseates, or does both. Execrations of Victorian hypocrisy invariably pounce on the trials and verdict, and moralists still frown at his name. So it is a wholesome exercise to read the verbatim reports of what was said and done at the Old Bailey in those dreadful months of 1895. Paradoxically enough, if only the master of paradox had been able to answer simply "Guilty" to his accusers, it is conceivable that by virtue of his attainments he would have been spared the unspeakable ignominy that hounded him in the remaining five years of his life. Rueful speculation!

### Play books

IN *A SHORT HISTORY OF ENGLISH DRAMA* (*Pelican Books*. 1s. 6d.) B. Ifor Evans is more specific:

... the tragedy of Wilde's life is that it removed him from the theatre when his contribution might have been so much more ample and varied.

There are bound to be brevities and blanks in a small book on a large theme,

and there is the same tiresome omission of an index, noted elsewhere by this reviewer of Dr. Evans's last "short history". But the scolding ends here and undiluted pleasure in the acuteness of his 'potted' assessments steps in. The giants receive their meed and, more important, the shaping and direction they derived from their predecessors and their own effect on lesser playwrights, are given due credit. The book is grist to the mill of this ever enchanting subject.—So is *THE RIGHT WAY TO RADIO PLAYWRITING* by Val Gielgud (*Rolls House Publishing Co.* 5s.) for those who seek a market for their wares. Though one may quarrel with the omniscience of the claim (Is Bernard Shaw's the "right way" to theatre playwriting? It is, for Bernard Shaw.) it must be conceded that the author should know how it is done after nineteen years as the B.B.C's Head of Drama. The listener too may profit from this guide, for it will help him to formulate the irritation that sometimes attacks him after a spell of wireless drama and so to discern coherently what is wrong.

### Eternal youth

A playwright in the making was Sidney Keyes and in *MINOS OF CRETE* (*Routledge*. 10s. 6d.) we are given his first fruits, *Hosea* and the *Minos* of the title. These emphasize his preoccupation with classical and Biblical themes, so apparent in his poetry, but do nothing to amplify that first tremendous impact. On the other hand, there are five short stories that confirm the impression left by a previous reading of one of them in a magazine, that here was a master of that difficult art. There is the essay that every young poet is impelled to write called "The Artist in Society"; there is his Notebook kept during his year's active service, and there are extracts from his letters. Finally, there are four poems, not included in the collected edition of 1945, written between the ages of twelve and eighteen. And that is all; inevitably *juvenilia* from a writer killed at twenty, yet sure indication of the maturity that belongs to his *Collected*



*Poems* and potent enough to justify what Keyes put into the mouth of Minos: "It is not death that kills. . . ."—It is not their fault that the power in the work of Sidney Keyes makes most other modern poets look fragile. Presumably IN THE LIGHT, a little group of little verses by Emma Tollemache and illustrated by Francis Rose (*Marlowe Galleries*, 40 *Elizabeth Street*, W.1. 15s.), was published for the author's private pleasure. Poetry mostly does not sell even when it is cheap; only our most *distingué* exponents dare charge fifteen shillings a time. The author sings prettily enough:

Come words,  
Show me visions bright,  
Fill me with delight.

Unfortunately, words are not enough.

### Against oblivion

Wondering what has become of William Gerhardt was less and less indulged in during the twenty-odd years since *Futility* and *The Polyglots* first proclaimed an excitingly important recruit to literature, and fitful publication in the 'thirties hardly caused a stir. Obviously this was no showman of letters. To those who know him not, THE MEMOIRS OF SATAN, RESURRECTION and PENDING HEAVEN (*Macdonald*, 7s. 6d. each) provide opportunities for filling the gap. All his work has a strong autobiographical flavour and depends on the slow building up of personality and situation. This is not the popular recipe, but old and trusty enough to deserve a trial.

### Fiction harvest

The batch of novels on the table have all given enjoyment in their different ways—a phenomenon in these arid times—and all are worthy of long and detailed reviews. There is SHE HAD TO BE QUEEN (*John Lane The Bodley Head*, 12s. 6d.) by Alice Harwood, who will be known to FORTNIGHTLY readers. Set in violent times, hers is the story, tenderly told, of the gentle Lady Jane Grey. The research, implicit in every

page, never obtrudes nor do merely imaginary thoughts do duty for historical facts. Another violent period is depicted in Nigel Balchin's THE BORGIA TESTAMENT (*Collins*, 9s. 6d.). Told by Cesare, Machiavelli's superman, the first person method and colloquial style yet avoid incongruity. Whitewashing the Borgias would be a futile task but the author has succeeded in giving some of the bloodstains a paler tint—and in richly demonstrating his widening scope. No SON OF MINE by G. B. Stern (*Cassell*, 10s. 6d.) deals with the "spurious son" of Robert Louis Stevenson. R.L.S. himself shines out from Miss Stern's reverently painted canvas with no fictional trimmings, and the growing belief of the younger Robert that he may indeed have inherited the great man's characteristics is, step by step, cleverly traced. Saul Bellow in THE VICTIM (*John Lehmann*, 9s. 6d.) infects his reader with Leventhal's fear in a New York nightmare. His sister-in-law's peasant superstition, Mary his wife, talked of but only met for a moment at the end, Philip, Nunez, are all seen clearly through the gathering terror. And there is a discussion about Victorian England—"A German queen, a British Empire, and an Italian Jew for Prime Minister"—in a cafeteria, so rare in an American novel of contemporary urban life as to engender effusive English thanks. Then, all that poetry of John Pudney has had a disciplinary effect on his prose. ESTUARY (*John Lane The Bodley Head*, 7s. 6d.) is a little gem, even though the drawing of Lord Telant is so distorted by the split personality craze as to suggest yet another film on the subject. But no camera outside France could catch the delicate overtones of the book, however assiduously it might photograph the landscape. Miss Perch, Trigger, Van, Jessie, Peter, Rosemary, Mrs. Marble, are sketched so truly that a life size oil in bold colours, with red tabs on, could not tell the reader more. A film could only tell us less.

GRACE BANYARD.